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FINANCIAL REFORM’S INTERNATIONALISM
David Zaring*
ABSTRACT
Financial reform has rebalanced the power of international engagement,
reducing the role of the President and his diplomats, and increasing that of
Congress and independent agencies. In so doing, the reforms have readjusted
a balance that many believe was skewed by the government’s response to the
financial crisis. The international policy of financial reform has doctrinal
implications as well: Congress has supplemented traditional international law
with an endorsement of international regulatory cooperation. Because of this
supplementation, the things that customary international law used to do—in
particular enabling international cooperation and creating innovation in
human rights—are now being done by financial regulators wielding the power
of informal agreements. The privileging of regulatory cooperation, and the
entry into human rights through financial regulation, is evidenced by the socalled Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction Rules that Congress has
directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to promulgate.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial reform has driven many changes in American governance, and it
was compelled in turn, in President Obama’s view, by an inability, before and
during the financial crisis, to respond to “the speed, scope, and sophistication
of a 21st century global economy.”1
So while the recalibration of financial regulation has contained
multitudes—in 2010, a supercommittee of federal officials was established to
monitor the financial sector,2 a financial consumer protection agency was
created,3 and banks were precluded from trying to make money in the capital
markets on their own accounts,4 among many other regulatory efforts5—its
potentially most dramatic reform may prove to be the American government’s
cautious, but wide-ranging, embrace of a reformed global regime to regulate
international finance.
The regime moves the equilibrium of the separation of powers in foreign
affairs towards Congress, rectifying, at least somewhat, a balance that many

1 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory
Reform (June 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-onRegulatory-Reform/.
2 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5322–5333 (2012) (authorizing the Financial Stability Oversight Council). This
committee has been named the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). For a scholarly evaluation of the
FSOC, see Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 475–76 (2011) (“FSOC is charged with
identifying risks to the financial stability of the United States.”). For a discussion of the way its members
might interact, see Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1148–49 (2012).
3 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491–5603 (creating the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB)). The agency
became a reality after a lengthy campaign by liberals, led by a law professor who in 2013 became a senator
after the establishment of the agency in 2010. As Rachel Barkow has explained, “Professor Elizabeth Warren
advocated for the creation of such an agency in 2007, and the financial meltdown that followed provided the
political impetus to turn the idea into reality.” Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 72 (2010). For a review of the authorizing statute of the
CFPB, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers
of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 921–23 (2011).
4 This is the so-called Volcker Rule, which prohibits banks from creating proprietary trading desks, on
which the banks might risk their own capital; it was passed in 2010 as part of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. See DAVID H. CARPENTER & M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43440, THE VOLCKER RULE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 & n.1 (2014). Late in 2013, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the FDIC, the
SEC, and the CFTC finalized the regulations designed to implement the rule. Id.; 12 C.F.R. § 44 (2015)
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency); id. § 75 (CFTC); id. § 248 (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System); id. § 255 (SEC); id. § 351 (FDIC).
5 For a comprehensive doctrinal overview, see CCH, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS (2010).
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thought was upended during the response to the financial crisis. It also uses the
informal way that financial regulatory standards spread across the globe to do
the work that customary international law used to do. This Article explores the
implications of these reforms and ultimately endorses them; the question is
whether they will spread to other areas of regulatory internationalism. The
struggle to keep up with the ever-globalizing economy suggests that they
might.
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act6
(hereinafter “Dodd–Frank”)—the signature domestic statute, passed in 2010,
and implemented slowly ever since—is the centerpiece of the reform of the
oversight of the financial system. It is the statute that gave regulators new
powers to oversee and, if necessary, close large and interconnected banks. It
also extended government oversight to the derivatives markets and created a
new agency to protect consumers, among other things. As such, it is arguably
one of the two most important statutes passed during the Obama
Administration.7
Dodd–Frank and the agencies charged with implementing it have taken
international steps as well; in particular, by embracing “soft law.”8 Soft law—
often, although not exclusively, agreements between regulators in two or more
countries—does not create formal legal obligations, but nonetheless contains
substantive commitments that the parties are expected to take seriously.9
6 See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act] (codified in scattered
sections of the U.S. Code).
7 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 587 (2011)
(noting the “substantive regulatory import of the ACA and Dodd-Frank” while making a case that the budget
stimulus was also critical).
8 For a well-known definition of the terms, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 445 (2000) (explaining how soft law negotiation
facilitates compromise and “provides for flexibility in implementation, helping states deal with the domestic
political and economic consequences of an agreement and thus increasing the efficiency with which it is
carried out”).
9 Some scholars use the term “soft law” more broadly—for example, to encompass the decisions of
international human rights committees or standards promulgated by non-governmental organizations. See, e.g.,
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
762, 834 (2012) (discussing “soft law” in the international human rights law context); Gregory Shaffer & Tom
Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 39 (2012) (discussing
the role of nonstate actors and “soft law” in the production of international environmental law). Conversely,
some scholars use terms like “political commitments” to refer to the kinds of agreements that may be described
as “soft law”. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the
Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 507, 516–24 (2009) (defining “political commitment” as “a nonlegally binding
agreement between two or more nation-states in which the parties intend to establish commitments of an
exclusively political or moral nature”).
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Because it involves regulators rather than diplomats, soft law broadens the set
of American actors who make foreign policy.10
In an era where Congress has started to take an assertive role in foreign
affairs—by, for example, inviting a foreign head of state to address it without
presidential consultation or approval11—financial reform exemplifies another
way that Congress can play a role. Congress can make delegations to
regulators, and in particular to regulators more likely to be responsive to it,
instead of the President.12 While scholars like Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule have argued that international relations, particularly in the wake of a
crisis, inevitably empower the Executive Branch, financial reform shows how
Congress can limit the power of these actors in post-crisis reform legislation,
partly by empowering the regulators more responsive to it than to the
Executive.13 This rebalancing is the critical domestic implication of financial
reform’s internationalism.

10 The foreign affairs role is usually thought to belong, almost exclusively, to the President and his
Secretary of State. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (discussing the executive
branch’s primacy in foreign affairs); see also Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation
of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1014–15, 1018 (2013) (describing the aggressive defenses made of
presidential authority over foreign relations).
11 Congress controversially invited the prime minister of Israel to address it without consulting the
President. See Peter Baker, In Congress, Netanyahu Faults ‘Bad Deal’ on Iran Nuclear Program, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/world/middleeast/netanyahu-congress-iran-israel-speech.
html (“Democrats blamed Mr. Netanyahu and Speaker John A. Boehner for arranging the event without
consulting the White House in an effort to undercut the president . . . .”).
12 See Mike Lillis, Pelosi Warns Netanyahu: Speech to Congress Will Hurt Iran Talks, HILL (Jan. 28,
2015, 8:09 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/231097-pelosi-warns-netanyahu-speech-to-congresscould-undermine-iran-talks (noting that the “invitation [was] extended without consulting Democratic leaders
in Congress or the White House”); Peter Spiro, Is Netanyahu’s Invite Unconstitutional, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 22,
2015, 8:18 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/01/22/boehners-netanyahu-invite-unconstitutional.
13 See ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN
REPUBLIC 4, 30 (2010) (emphasizing the role of the executive in times of crisis). For further discussion of the
authors’ thesis, see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND CONSPIRACY 55, 57–58 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial
Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613 (2009). This claim of deference by the legislature and the judiciary
hearkens back to some of the judicial modesty literature praised by scholars and judges such as Alexander
Bickel and Learned Hand. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 69 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962) (arguing that courts ought to
exercise judicial modesty in assessing the constitutionality of most sorts of government action); LEARNED
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958, at 15 (1958). For a discussion
and evaluation of Posner and Vermeule’s claims in the context of financial regulation, see David Zaring,
Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405, 1407, 1415–17, 1481 (2014).
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But that reform has an important implication for international law doctrine,
as well. Soft law’s partial dislodgment of treaties, driven by the difficulties—
particularly in the United States—associated with negotiating and ratifying
formal instruments, has been the subject of prior writing by Andrew Guzman
and Kal Raustiala, among others.14 In the wake of the financial crisis, there has
been almost no effort, either globally, or in the United States, to create a formal
International Financial Organization that might do the work that Congress has
directed agencies to do in Dodd–Frank.15 Treaties are the traditional approach
to international governance, but they have been ignored by policymakers when
it comes to the problems posed by the globalization of finance—a development
that has come to be expected by scholars.16 The relationship between
regulatory cooperation and the treaty has been well documented.17
Less studied is the way that soft law has displaced functions of customary
international law, the other traditional way to make international rules.
Specifically, financial reform is displacing two customary international law
functions.
First, the new approach to financial regulation has sought to facilitate
conversation among international actors and provide them with a platform for
greater international cooperation. In doing so, it has replaced the “rules of the
road” function of custom. As Senator Jon Kyl, diplomat Douglas Feith, and
John Fonte have said, “Americans can benefit from international cooperation
that is rooted in countries’ widespread acceptance of useful rules of the
14 See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823,
1880 (2002) (“[S]oft law remains largely outside the theoretical framework of international legal scholars.”);
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 587–92 (2005)
[hereinafter Raustiala, Form and Substance]. Often, the authorizing of agencies to either do deals with or set
examples for their foreign counterparts has been described as choice against formal international organizations
like the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, which were created by complex
multilateral treaties. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 579, 588 n.41 (2005) [hereinafter Guzman, Design] (noting that “the choice of form (i.e., treaty v. soft law)
can be traded off against the substance of an agreement”); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3, 29
(2002).
15 Maura Reynolds, Cautious Steps on Economy, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/
2008/nov/14/world/fg-summit14 (“French President Nicolas Sarkozy . . . called for a ‘second Bretton Woods’
conference to remake international financial organizations.”). But see Douglas W. Arner, Michael A. Panton &
Paul Lejot, Central Banks and Central Bank Cooperation in the Global Financial System, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2010) (suggesting that such a treaty will be prohibitively difficult to conclude).
16 See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 683
(2012).
17 See, e.g., Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 14.
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road.”18 Those rules of the road used to be set by customary international law
doctrines, such as diplomatic immunity, state responsibility, and others that
served to facilitate international cooperation, without requiring substantive
commitments. In finance now, it is informal cooperation that is creating the
institutions for agreement. Soft law networks of regulators now set the critical
terms of domestic financial reform regulation, and international summits by
heads of state and finance ministers are the places where the fruits and agendas
of that cooperation are set and reviewed.
Second, it has been used as the vehicle for creating innovations in human
rights. Human rights innovations have been a second, if controversial, function
of customary international law. But financial reform in America includes new
human rights commitment set not by claims of custom but by regulatory
example meant to be adopted by the rest of the world. In particular, Dodd–
Frank requires one of America’s financial regulators, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), to privilege international human rights values in
a novel way.19 Its Conflict Minerals Rule requires manufacturers who use
resources extracted from war-torn Central Africa to disclose that use, or to
disclose the steps taken to ensure that they are not using African resources, in
an effort to reduce the funding for civil conflict in the region.20 Dodd–Frank’s
Resource Extraction Rule, a transparency measure, requires extractive
industries such as mining and oil companies to disclose every payment made to
a government in a country in which they do extractive business.21 Both are
controversial—Roberta Romano has argued that they will impose
“considerable costs . . . which could well be in a multiple of billions of
dollars,” despite having “no connection to the financial crisis, the ostensible
focus of the legislation.”22 Others have wondered why the United States would

18 Jon Kyl, Douglas Feith & John Fonte, The War of Law: How New International Law Undermines
Democratic Sovereignty, FOREIGN AFF., July–Aug. 2013, at 115, 125, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
139459/jon-kyl-douglas-j-feith-and-john-fonte/the-war-of-law.
19 Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: Does Corporate Law Reach
Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 113, 116 (2013) (observing “corporations are increasingly
being held to account for the human rights impact of their operations”).
20 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13p-1, 249b.400 (2015).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q).
22 Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial
Regulation, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25, 61 & n.131, 62 n.132 (2014). The National Association of Manufacturers
agreed, and filed suit against the rule, partly for this reason. See Opening Brief of Petitioners at 1, Nat’l Ass’n
of Mfrs. v. SEC, 956 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1422) (challenging the Conflict Minerals rule on
the grounds that “the rule will impose staggering costs on American businesses”).
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begin a global human rights campaign without requiring other countries to
adopt the same rules as a matter of formal law.23
This function of financial reform’s internationalism offers evidence of a
shift away from using traditional international law and international diplomacy
and towards technocratic, soft law decisions driven by agency agreements and
regulations.24 It is a different kind of international governance, but there is no
doubt that it has captured the attention of American policymakers.
The changes in the domestic balance of powers in foreign affairs and in the
international relevance of customary international law are intertwined. Public
international law used to very much be the province of the executive, and
turning to different means to effectuate international governance opens gaps
for other actors—in this case, financial regulators—to fill.25 The reliance on
regulators disempowers the diplomats who, in part, made foreign policy by
engaging with the traditional ways that customary international law offered a
path for evolution of the international legal system. The turn away from
custom and the empowerment of independent agencies that are the critical
components of financial reform’s internationalism are, in many ways, two
sides of one coin that Congress has cashed in an effort to change the balance of
power between the branches of government in foreign affairs.
Before proceeding with the argument, and the specifics of how financial
reform achieves these goals, some caveats are in order: None of this means that
the President has been entirely dispossessed in foreign affairs, and the
existence of a soft law alternative to hard international law does not mean that
hard international law has no role. Treaties, though hard to ratify, will continue
to be negotiated. Even customary international law will continue to facilitate
the work of diplomats who wish to fill in the interstices between treaty regimes
23 See, e.g., Allison M. Blake, Note, SEC Cannot Cleanse the Electronics Industry Alone: “Blood
Minerals” Mandatory Disclosure Legislation Effective Only If Applied Across the Board, 39 J. CORP. L. 395,
410 (2014) (the Conflict Minerals Rule “will not sufficiently address humanitarian concerns unless other
countries pass similar rules”); Thea Reilkoff, Note, Legislating Corporate Social Responsibility: Expanding
Social Disclosure Through the Resource Extraction Disclosure Rule, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2435, 2438 (2014)
(suggesting that the Resource Extraction Rule will only work “as part of the growing international movement
for transparency in the extraction industry”).
24 At the same time, the so-called soft nature of the sort of cooperation authorized by Dodd–Frank has
become something seemingly more than voluntary. International law operates by consensus, and financial
regulation has adopted that paradigm. Hard international economic law has also embraced various principles,
like national treatment and most-favored-nation policies. See Zaring, supra note 16. Financial regulation has
embraced those as well, and has become predictable, elaborated, and organized. Id.
25 See infra Part III.B.1.
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without relying on regulators to do so. And the agency-driven model of
international governance will never supplant the central role of the President in
foreign affairs; rather, it will build international institutions that supplement the
high politics of, say, conflicts with Russia and the War on Terror in areas that
may have more import but less heft on the evening news. Finally, although
Congress in Dodd–Frank empowered independent agencies more responsive to
it than to the President, the President sets the tone for these agencies by
supervising the networks both domestically, through the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC), and internationally through the Group of Twenty
(G20) and the Financial Stability Board.
Part I is the first evidentiary portion of the Article; it engages in a close
inquiry into the nature of the regulatory cooperation required in financial
reform. Part II is a second evidentiary portion; it looks at two provisions of
Dodd–Frank—the Conflict Minerals Rule and the Resource Extraction Rule—
and argues that they represent a new way that the United States may go about
the discovery and propagation of new human rights. Both of these Parts delve
into the depths of the doctrine, but, then, the ability to do so with an
understanding of the doctrine’s implications is one of the comparative
advantages of legal scholarship. Part III contrasts financial reform’s
internationalism with customary international law. It shows how soft law is
increasingly supplanting custom as regulatory governance welcomes a viable
alternative to law created through diplomatic interaction. Part III also considers
how the choice of soft law has changed the traditional calibration of the
separation of powers in foreign affairs. Finally, it briefly considers the role of
ethics in regulating international corporate conduct. A brief conclusion
follows.
I. FINANCIAL REFORM THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Financial reform in the wake of the financial crisis was meant to transform
the financial sector into something safer and sounder; Congress concluded that
the best way to ensure the stability of American finance would be to address
stability more globally, and accordingly addressed the global financial system
numerous times in the statute.26
26 As Stephen Park has observed, “The risks resulting from regulatory gaps caused by antiquated
domestic regimes and inadequate international coordination were exposed in unprecedented ways during the
financial crisis and its aftermath. The Dodd–Frank Act can be viewed as a direct response.” Stephen Kim Park,
Guarding the Guardians: The Case for Regulating State-Owned Financial Entities in Global Finance, 16 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 739, 745 (2014); see also Arthur W.S. Duff & David Zaring, New Paradigms and Familiar
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But the way Congress chose to do so is telling. There are two techniques
used in the domestic statute to address the global regulation of finance.
First, Dodd–Frank relies on transgovernmental relationships between
regulators to solve global problems. In some cases it requires, in other cases it
authorizes, American financial supervisors to work with their foreign
counterparts to develop standards meant to ensure the safety of the financial
system. In this way, the statute pursues international regulatory cooperation in
lieu of other mechanisms for creating workable cross-border systems of
governance meant to ensure financial stability in the United States. The treaty,
for example, is eschewed. Nor did Congress suggest that the regulatory
cooperation it authorized was in any way obligated by customary international
law.27 Instead, financial reform marks an effort to solve the global aspects of
financial instability through coordination enforced and enabled by soft law.
Regulatory cooperation is not the only way that financial reform seeks to
reform international norms. It also, through the so-called Conflict Minerals and
Resource Extraction Rules, represents an effort by Congress—acting through a
regulator engaged in the sort of soft law cooperation elsewhere encouraged
through the statute—to set an example and join or start a movement that may,
in the end, form the basis of claims about new obligations related to human
rights.
This section recounts financial reform’s cooperation impetus, and the next
one covers its more tendentious moves to facilitate global transparency and
anti-conflict norms. Part III makes the case that customary international law
used to play a role that soft law is now handling, and analyzes the separation of
powers implications of the move.
A. Authorizing Cooperation
Portions of Dodd–Frank are premised on the supposition that it is difficult
for domestic regulators to do a good job of monitoring the safety and
soundness of institutions that operate in many different jurisdictions by only
Tools in the New Derivatives Regulation, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 677, 701 (2013) (describing the derivatives
provisions of Dodd–Frank as reflecting a “commitment to international cooperation”).
27 But few American statutes do these days—something that was not always the case. See Anthony J.
Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 449
(2011) (discussing how the “First Congress . . . enacted several statutory provisions—including the ATS—in
order to comply with the United States’ obligations under the law of nations to redress violations by its
citizens”).
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focusing on their activities in one of those jurisdictions—the United States.
This supposition is not entirely new; financial regulators have been pursuing
common approaches to supervision with their foreign counterparts since the
1970s.28 The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 explicitly required
banking regulators to “consult with the banking supervisory authorities of
other countries to reach understandings aimed at achieving the adoption of
effective and consistent supervisory policies and practices with respect to
international lending.”29 However, these cooperative initiatives have been, in
large part, initiated of the regulators’ own accord, rather than at the behest of
Congress or the State Department. Dodd–Frank provides a degree of
congressional imprimatur on the global regulatory project—a sorely needed
one, in the view of some—on an increasingly important form of governance.30
In financial reform, Congress has endorsed international regulatory
cooperation as the way forward for financial regulators dealing with
cross-border problems in three different ways. It has, on occasion, required
American regulators to coordinate their activities with their foreign
counterparts. Elsewhere, Congress merely authorizes that coordination.
Occasionally, it only requests domestic agencies to study the prospect of
international regulatory cooperation.
What follows will cover the specific invitations to regulatory cooperation
that appear in the statute—it will be exhaustive, as the invitations focus on
particular parts of financial regulation where international cooperation is
thought to be particularly important. Because these areas are worth
understanding, readers will hopefully tolerate a trip into some of the details of
the statute. Those less interested in the details than in the implications may
wish to skip this subsection and move on to the next, more evaluative one.
1. Required Cooperation
Dodd–Frank imposes international consultation requirements on five
different agencies, in more than five different issue-areas—the Treasury
Department, the Federal Reserve, the Commodities Futures Trading
28 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) (discussing the interdependent nature
of the international financial system); David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law,
46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 563, 570–78 (2008) (using this sort of regulatory cooperation as an example of
how global administrative law can develop).
29 12 U.S.C. § 3901(b) (2012).
30 See David Zaring, Free Trade Through Regulation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2016)
(manuscript at Part IV) (on file with author).
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Commission (CFTC), and the SEC, all of which are members of the committee
of agencies charged with broadly ensuring financial stability and are tasked
with coordination obligations. So is that committee of agencies itself. Their
obligations range from identifying particularly risky international institutions
and dangerous derivatives transactions, coordinating insurance and accounting
standards, and dealing with international bankruptcies.
Two examples of required coordination illustrate what Congress means
when it insists on interaction with foreign regulators. First, the statute created a
systemic risk regulator, or a regulator tasked with identifying serious threats to
the stability of the financial sector.31 That regulator, really a committee of
agencies chaired by the Treasury Department, was dubbed the FSOC and was
charged with “identify[ing] risks to the financial stability of the United
States . . . promot[ing] market discipline . . . and respond[ing] to emerging
threats to the stability of the United States financial system.”32
Risks to the financial stability of the United States can come from abroad,
just as well-run and safe foreign firms can promote market discipline when
they compete with American firms. Accordingly, the FSOC has pledged to
“work actively with our international counterparts.”33 It is required to
“monitor . . . international financial regulatory proposals and developments”
and coordinate with foreign regulators to reduce systemic risk, a broad
authorization to pursue global approaches.34 The authorization from Congress
in this case, as in others, notably does not offer guidance as to how the FSOC
might do this monitoring and coordination, though it does limit the subject
matter of the cooperation.

31

Some would say that because the financial sector is so intertwined with the economy, this systemic
regulator is really concerned with threats to the economy itself. See Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats,
and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 624 n.7 (2012)
(suggesting that the systemic regulator’s “role is to provide a unifying regulatory perspective on systemic
risk”). As a statutory matter, the systemic risk regulator is concerned with, among other things, “identify[ing]
risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial distress or failure,
or ongoing activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies.” 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1)(A).
32 Id. § 5322(a)(1).
33 Oversight of the Financial Stability Oversight Council: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of H. Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. app. 86 (2011) (prepared statement of J.
Nellie Liang, Director, Office of Financial Stability Policy and Research) (observing that it is “important that
U.S. financial reforms be implemented in coordination with international efforts to establish consistent and
complementary standards and to ensure effective oversight of internationally active firms and markets”).
34 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a).
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The FSOC can also designate foreign banks that do business in the United
States as institutions that are “systemically important”—that is, banks whose
failure would pose substantial risks for the American financial sector.35 If
designated, all such banks are subject to additional supervision by American
bank regulators, and may be subject to special rules imposed by the FSOC in
light of their significance to the economy.36 Under § 113(f) of Dodd–Frank,
however, the agency may, in an emergency, subject a foreign institution to its
supervision if it finds that the collapse of the institution would threaten
American financial stability.37 In doing so, it is obligated to consult with “the
appropriate home country supervisor, if any.”38 In this way, the especially
attentive regulation of very large foreign financial institutions doing business
in the United States is a power granted to the FSOC, but it is one that must be
exercised in the context of consultation with the foreign regulator responsible
for supervising the bank in its home country.
The requirement of consultation appears in a number of other parts of the
statute. Another example of this sort of cooperation lies in the way the statute
creates a new regime to regulate previously unregulated swap markets. Many
observers of the financial crisis have credited the risks posed by complex
derivatives—or, to slightly oversimplify, and use the language of Dodd–Frank,
“swaps”39—as one of the reasons for the collapse of certain key
intermediaries.40
Much of the risky swaps activity happened outside of the United States.
The American International Group, for example, wrote insufficiently hedged
credit default swaps—that is, insurance that certain companies would not
default on their debts—for seemingly any other financial institution that asked,

35

Id. § 5462(9).
Id. § 5323.
37 Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 113(f), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5323(f)(1)).
38 12 U.S.C. § 5323(f)(3).
39 15 U.S.C. § 8301.
40 See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 55, 87 (2011) (“OTC derivatives . . . are thought to have exacerbated the crisis . . . .”); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009) (noting the ways in
which complex derivatives and securitization practices contributed to the financial crisis); Schwarcz, supra
note 28 (noting the role of derivatives in the international financial system). But see René M. Stulz, Financial
Derivatives: Lessons from the Subprime Crisis, MILKEN INST. REV., Jan. 2009, at 58, 58–60 (blaming the
financial crisis on the housing bubble).
36
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and collapsed when those insurance bets went awry.41 It did so, however,
through a London-based subsidiary, AIG Financial Products.42 Other foreign
financial institutions took positions on swaps—for example, on derivatives that
referenced American mortgages—that lost substantial value during the crisis,
putting those institutions at risk, and in some cases, requiring a bailout.43
Congress accordingly concluded that the swaps market was both too
unregulated and too international to be excised from regulatory oversight;
Dodd–Frank extended the jurisdiction of American regulators to swaps.
Moreover, it made that regulation international. In establishing a new regime to
regulate credit default, currency, and other swaps, the two agencies charged
with implementing American oversight over the swaps, the SEC and the
CFTC, are required to engage in international cooperation. Along with the
prudential regulators, they “shall consult and coordinate with foreign
regulatory authorities on the establishment of consistent international standards
with respect to the regulation (including fees) of swaps.”44
In this way, Congress placed international cooperation at the forefront of
the new swaps regime. Moreover, Dodd–Frank defines swaps quite broadly, to
include a large enough variety of derivatives that the SEC and CFTC have both
exempted certain kinds of financial contracts from the coverage of the term in
rulemakings implementing the statute by regulation, making the required
international cooperation an important component of a broad new regulatory
approach.45 The requirement of consultation thus broadly reaches into the more
bespoke and esoteric areas of the financial markets. Of course, it did so
because those areas hypertrophied in the run-up to the financial crisis, and
41 Jerome A. Madden, A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default Swaps Bring Down AIG
and Lehman Brothers, BUS. L. BRIEF, Fall 2008, at 15, 16–18 (2008); Vidya Ram AIG Blames Its London
Office, FORBES (Mar. 13, 2009, 1:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/13/aig-london-losses-marketsequity-insurance.html. “In 2008, AIG was the largest originator of CDSs and had CDS contracts on its books
with a notional value (the face amount of the insured debt) of approximately $440 billion.” Madden, supra, at
16.
42 Madden, supra note 41, at 16.
43 Various European banks, for example, invested in housing related derivatives during the crisis in a
way that put their solvency at risk. Daniel Slifkin, The Changing Landscape of Securities Litigation,
ASPATORE, 2014 WL 1245074, at *3 (2014) (observing that “[f]oreign banks that purchased mortgage-backed
securities from U.S.-based financial institutions or were purportedly assigned claims involving mortgagebacked securities have also filed a number of large securities claims in recent years”).
44 15 U.S.C. § 8325(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
45 Dodd–Frank Act § 723, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h); id. § 763, 15 U.S.C. § 78c-3; Adam J. Levitin, Response: The
Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 447 n.5 (2013) (“The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are empowered
to exempt certain types of swaps from the clearing requirement.”).
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ground to a halt in the midst of it, challenging the solvency of firms that
funded themselves by taking substantial positions on the derivatives.46
In dealing with systemic risk, Dodd–Frank imposes similar duties on other
regulators and, with regard to the White House, an authorization. The statute
requires the Treasury Secretary to “regularly consult with the financial
regulatory entities and other appropriate organizations of foreign governments
or international organizations on matters relating to systemic risk to the
international financial system.”47 It also requires that the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury “consult with
their foreign counterparts and through appropriate multilateral organizations to
encourage comprehensive and robust prudential supervision and regulation for
all highly leveraged and interconnected financial companies.”48
The Federal Reserve is also required to look to international soft law when
it prescribes risk management rules for banks—that is, the rules that govern
how banks assess the riskiness of the positions they take in the financial
markets. The statute imposes a duty that “the Board of Governors [of the
Federal Reserve] . . . shall prescribe risk management standards, taking into
consideration relevant international standards and existing prudential
requirements.”49
2. Permitted Cooperation
Otherwise, the statute takes an authorized, but not required, approach to
regulatory cooperation. For example, the FSOC is authorized to consult with
appropriate foreign authorities when dealing with foreign entities and cross
border activities and markets.50 The statute authorizes, and, as we have seen,

46

See, e.g., Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 55, 60–61 (2011) (“Many believe the mismanagement of counterparty risk in the OTC derivatives
market played an important contributing role in the financial crisis.”); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s
Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 543 (2011) (discussing the size and
reasons for failures of the derivatives and overnight repo markets, which he attributes to the preference they
enjoy in bankruptcy).
47 12 U.S.C. § 5373(b).
48 Id. § 5373(c). For a discussion, see Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate
Responsibility in International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1450 (2011) (reasoning that
“[a]lthough the mandates of section 175 are vague, Congress’s acknowledgement of the need for international
coordination is admirable”).
49 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(1).
50 Id. § 5373(b).

ZARING GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

FINANCIAL REFORM’S INTERNATIONALISM

5/27/2016 10:10 AM

1269

sometimes requires, international policy coordination on the part of the FSOC,
the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury Secretary on matters of systemic risk.51
The Act also allows the President or his designates to “coordinate through all
available international policy channels, similar policies as those found in
United States law relating to limiting the scope, nature, size, scale,
concentration, and interconnectedness of financial companies, in order to
protect financial stability and the global economy.”52
The statute requires consultation on international standards for swaps but
takes a more casual view regarding the exchange of information about swaps
positions and markets; the SEC and CFTC “may agree to such
information-sharing arrangements as may be deemed to be necessary or
appropriate in the public interest.”53 In this way, the agencies are granted the
power to share information about the positions and risks posed by the
institutions they regulate with foreign regulators who may worry about how
those positions would affect their own banks, if those banks are doing business
with the American banks, or with the branches of the American institutions on
foreign soil.
The newly created Federal Insurance Office, based in the Treasury
Department, has been authorized “to coordinate Federal efforts and develop
Federal policy on prudential aspects of international insurance matters.”54
Nor are these the only areas of consultation. In the case of the new swaps
regime, authorizations to coordinate exist for reporting on the swaps market,55
regulating the retention of data over what has happened in those markets,56
setting up swaps clearinghouses and supervisors of the same.57
A similar authorization is given to the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board—the government body that regulates accounting firms, in the
statute.58 It is given the right to share information about foreign auditors with
51

Id. § 5373.
Id. § 5373(a).
53 15 U.S.C. § 8325(a).
54 31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(1)(E).
55 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(14)(B)(ii).
56 Id. § 24a.
57 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1.
58 See id. § 7215(b)(5)(C). “[A]ll information . . . that relates to a public accounting firm that a foreign
government has empowered a foreign auditor oversight authority to inspect . . . may, at the discretion of the
Board, be made available to the foreign auditor oversight authority, if . . . the Board finds that it is necessary to
accomplish the purposes of this Act or to protect investors . . . .” Id.
52
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the foreign authorities regulating those auditors—presumably in a way that
enables the foreign authority to take steps to ensure that the auditing firm is
maintaining appropriately high standards.
These authorizations are designed to offer the legitimacy of a congressional
imprimatur to agency activity that has been quite vigorously pursued before
Dodd–Frank but has been notably lacking in that authorization.59
3. Studying Cooperation
Finally, agencies have been required to study international regulatory
cooperation in Dodd–Frank. Study requirements are replete in Dodd–Frank;
there are seventy studies mandated by the statute.60 Study requirements works
as prompts for regulation. They also reflect a degree of legislative ambivalence
on the issue for study (or, just as possibly, internal disagreement). At any rate,
the presumption of a study is that the regulator has the authority to regulate in
any particular area, but that it may not choose to do so; studies work as
congressional suggestions that the regulator consider doing so.
Studying the possibilities of international financial regulation reflects this
sort of modest congressional guidance. For example, studies, rather than rules,
have marked Dodd–Frank’s explicit statement about the vexing problem of the
failure of a cross-border bank. No one doubts that the rules for taking globally
important financial institutions through a so-called “cross-border resolution”
process are imperfect; the disaster of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,
where creditors rushed to courthouses across the globe, exemplifies the
concern.61
The complications posed by simply sorting out who ought to be in charge
of a global bankruptcy have made the effort to create an international process
to “resolve,” or quickly take over failing financial firms, a high priority for
representatives of the G20 major economies.

59 David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative State, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 61–
67 (2013).
60 Regulatory Tracker, DAVIS POLK, http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank/regulatory-tracker/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2016).
61 For a discussion of the issues, see Jonathan Macey, Are Any Creditors “Particularly Deserving”?: On
the Enduring Attraction of the Ring-Fence Approach to Cross-Border Insolvencies of Financial Institutions,
31 YALE J. ON REG. 695, 702–05, 709–11 (2014).
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But the FSOC has been told only to study international bankruptcy
processes.62 The comptroller general has been instructed to do the same.63 The
statute stopped short of authorizing cooperation about cross-border
bankruptcy.64 But by permitting the study of the area by the FSOC, at least,
Congress has suggested that the council may have the power to do more than
research.
The new swaps regime requires studies about the descriptions on financial
derivatives by the SEC and CFTC, which “shall coordinate the study with
international financial institutions and regulators as appropriate and
practical.”65
These studies reflect a sense that Congress was not exactly sure what to do
about some aspects of financial reform. The studies are hardly necessary to the
creation of comprehensive remediation regimes that may in some ways have
simply created more work for agencies. Agencies already have the power to
conduct studies, and Congress has the power to ask for such studies through
their regular appropriations and supervisions oversight.
Nonetheless, the existence of studies in Dodd–Frank suggest a light form of
authorization for international cooperation, to go along with the more explicit
form that is seen in other portions of the statute.
B. Evaluating Cooperation
Dodd–Frank’s authorization of international regulatory cooperation uses
soft law to do what customary international law used to do through doctrines
like state responsibility and diplomatic immunity—create institutions and
mechanisms designed to further international rules of cooperation without
imposing particular substantive requirements on that cooperation.66 It is
increasingly apparent that soft law is the sort of law preferred by the
international community when it comes to financial regulation. This may be
62

Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 217, 124 Stat. 1376, 1519–20 (2010).
12 U.S.C. § 5382(f) (2012).
64 Possibly because there’s some doubt as to whether the bankruptcy regime should be worked out
through a treaty or through regulatory cooperation. See, e.g., Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of
International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1454 (2013) (evincing some skepticism about the
possibility that international regulatory cooperation on this issue but noting that “the absence of agreement on
cross-border resolution also undermines coordinated cross-border supervision by dissociating supervisory
responsibility from financial responsibility”).
65 15 U.S.C. § 8307(b)(3).
66 See infra Part III.A.
63
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because it is effective, but it may also reflect dissatisfaction with the
alternatives to soft law, and some caution about the promise of a stringent
international regime.
That soft law may be the future of cross-border cooperation more generally
may be seen in the way it has been embraced not just by financial regulators,
or now by Congress, but also by the world’s heads of state. The endorsement
of international regulatory cooperation in financial reform meets some of the
informal commitments made by the President in the wake of the financial
crisis. In the wake of that collapse, the so-called G20—a gathering of the heads
of state of twenty of the world’s largest economies—was reinvigorated, with
an eye to devising a collective strategy to prevent similar crises from happing
in the future.67
The G20 called for international regulatory coordination at the Pittsburgh
Summit that was the third meeting after the onset of the financial crisis.68 It
announced at the conclusion of its 2009 London Summit that its membership
“agree[d] to establish the much greater consistency and systematic cooperation
between countries, and the framework of internationally agreed high standards,
that a global financial system requires.”69
But this commitment to a cooperative international regime comes with
some implicit cautions. Dodd–Frank does not broadly authorize all forms of
cooperation by all regulators on any issue area; instead it picks spots. I have
elsewhere argued that soft law is an increasingly institutionalized and effective
mechanism of international governance—one that in financial regulation, at
least, is not clearly inferior to any more formal alternative.70 But there is no
question that it does permit American regulators the flexibility to reject

67

“In response to the global financial crisis, the governments of the Group of Twenty (G-20) began
focusing on greater coordination of their regulatory and supervisory activities, and they called for a number of
measures aimed at creating an institutional structure for overseeing financial markets across borders.” Saule T.
Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
411, 436 n.95 (2011).
68 Group of Twenty [G20], Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 24–25, 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_
statement_250909.pdf (noting the importance of coordinated international efforts in addressing the financial
crisis); The Group of 20: The Premier Forum for International Economic Cooperation, GLOBAL AFF. CAN.,
http://www.international.gc.ca/g20/index.aspx?lang=eng (last modified Dec. 8, 2015).
69 G20, G20 London Summit: Official Communique (Apr. 2, 2009), http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/
article_8622_fr.htm.
70 See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 683
(2012).
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international cooperation, provided that they do so only after consulting their
foreign counterparts and monitoring its potential.
Finally, there are some notable silences with regard to international
regulatory cooperation that permeate the statute. Two of the principal goals of
the legislation—to create a new system for overseeing risky financial
institutions and to bring derivatives into the fold as a regulated industry—are
marbled with requirements to try to develop a coordinated international
approach, as well as permissions to do so. Other, more modest efforts, have
their bows to international regulatory cooperation as well. But financial reform
has other goals that do not encourage international cooperation. Some of the
other signature aspects of reform—the Volcker Rule,71 the swaps-pushout
rule,72 the creation of a new agency to protect consumers who enter the
financial marketplace73—mark uniquely American innovations in financial
supervision; there is no effort in these cases to coordinate with foreign
counterparts who do not share these agendas.
II. FINANCIAL REFORM’S EMBRACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Financial reform does not only permit, or in some cases require, American
financial regulators to cooperate with their foreign counterparts. It also requires
one regulator to pursue two kinds of values that reflect American commitments
to human rights. A commitment to human rights is not ordinarily thought to be
a central part of the remit of financial regulation, so these bows to human
rights values might be considered new and perhaps exceptionally so.74
The embrace of these values can be discerned in two parts of Dodd–Frank:
the requirement on disclosure of the use of certain so-called conflict minerals
by publicly traded manufacturers, and the requirement on the reporting of
government payments made by mineral extraction companies.

71 Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1851 (2012)). The statute is called the “Volcker Rule” because former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul
Volcker strongly supported the law. For a discussion, see John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 974 n.336 (2015).
72 For an analysis of the swaps-pushout rule by a former SEC commissioner, see Annette L. Nazareth,
Dodd-Frank Act Finalizes Swap Pushout Rule, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7,
2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/dodd-frank-act-finalizes-swap-pushout-rule/.
73 12 U.S.C § 5491(a).
74 Indeed, Dodd–Frank also includes a protection for mine workers. 15 U.S.C. § 78m-2 (“Reporting
Requirements Regarding Coal or Other Mine Safety”).
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The first human rights value lies in the requirement of reporting by those
firms that use minerals extracted from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
or countries bordering it.75 These countries have been beset by civil war and
there appears to have been a concern on the part of Congress that American
companies were prolonging the war by paying for minerals extracted and sold
by the factions party to the conflict.76
As for the extractive industries requirement, publicly traded companies
must report all payments to governments in their disclosure statements, an
embodiment of an anticorruption principal that is a hotly contested issue of
customary international law.77 The requirement builds on the American
interest—perhaps it might be considered to be an obsession—with
incorruptible governance, an interest reflected in Congress’s delegation of antibribery responsibilities to the SEC under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977.78 That statute was accompanied by a relatively successful campaign to
spread similar rules among OECD member countries.79
Resource extraction payment rules are also spreading across borders, but in
this case, it is not the United States that has led the charge; the rules have their
origins in a campaign created by a British non-governmental organization. The
American embrace of a principle that was gaining steam elsewhere—through
an agency rule, rather than the efforts of diplomats—marks a turn towards
building human rights principles through soft law.80
In both cases, the SEC has been tasked with issuing rules requiring the
disclosure of the making of resource extraction payments or the use of conflict
minerals. The SEC’s new international duties mark a shift for an agency that
used to ignore the world beyond the country’s borders, which coincided with a
presumption that the American capital markets were the only markets that
mattered for the American investors the agency protects.81 The SEC has been
75

15 U.S.C. § 78m(p).
There have been efforts in the past by different senators to address the issue through legislation: for
example, the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009. See infra notes 98–102, and accompanying text.
77 For the full text of this portion of the statute, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q).
78 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
79 Members of the OECD, as well as others, have adopted the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Bribery in International Business, ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last
visited Apr. 7, 2016).
80 See infra Part II.A.1.
81 Though, to be sure, ever since Congress gave the agency powers in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
to sanction American firms that bribe foreign government officials, the SEC has been taking a stand in favor of
76
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slower than other financial regulation to embrace international regulatory
cooperation.82 But financial reform has made it a leading edge in human rights
protection, whether it wants to be or not.
The Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction Rules of Dodd–Frank are
an accordingly fascinating development. In precisely the subject area in which
soft law seems to be taking hold—financial regulation more broadly, and
securities regulation in particular—the United States has adopted a new effort
that is designed in part to promote something that in the past might have been
left to customary international law.83
In what follows, I again delve into the weeds of the Conflict Minerals and
Resource Extraction Rules. In the final part of this Article, I make the case that
these rules represent a new form of international rulemaking, one that is
capable of supplanting more traditional types of international law.
A. The Conflict Minerals Rule
The campaign against the use of conflict minerals in American products
has been used by Congress as a chance to make symbolic statements about
human rights. It is easy to overstate the substance of the rule, though its
novelty makes it a particularly innovative aspect of financial reform. That
Congress is doing so in the context of the dry requirements of securities filings
is new, as is the effort to require companies to monitor their own supply
chains. As we will see, the scope of this sort of monitoring has alarmed
corporate America as much as any initiative contained in financial reform.

the American approach to honest government. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (discussing the creation in 2010
of the SEC’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit and noting that FCPA enforcement “continues to be a high
priority area for the SEC”). Though it was not ever thus. See Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act in Merger and Acquisition Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS.
247, 257 (2010) (“The SEC’s concern with questionable foreign payments was not primarily motivated by
bribery as an independent matter, but rather the extent to which bribe payments poisoned corporate disclosures
and, more broadly, U.S. capital markets.”).
82 David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L.
547, 565–69 (2005) (discussing international harmonization in securities regulation).
83 Moreover, of course, it did so through the mechanism of a duly-enacted statute authorizing and
charging an agency to pursue human rights-related values.
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1. The Rule’s Requirements
Congress has demanded in Dodd–Frank that public company filings
involved in manufacturing include disclosures about the use of a very small
number of ingredients extracted from a conflict-ridden part of Africa. The
legislature concluded, in the preamble to the statutory authorization to the rule,
that “the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized
by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an
emergency humanitarian situation therein.”84 The legislation is meant to
discourage support for rebel groups in the Congo, who appeared after the
central government of that country collapsed following the death of its
longtime dictator Mobuto Sese Seko in the last decade.85
The legislation requires disclosure by some companies about the use of
some minerals in their manufacturing processes. But it did not act
comprehensively. The provision covers only four minerals, and then only if
mined in one of ten southern African countries.86 So-called blood diamonds are
not included, even though most people probably think of them when they think
of conflict minerals (an unrelated statute covers those in a rather different
way).87 Nor are other precious stones. Oil is a mineral that has inspired plenty
of conflict as well, including in southern Africa, but it is not on the list.
Firms that actually mine the minerals are not covered by the law either; it
applies only to manufacturers.88 And even manufacturers are not prohibited
from using any of the minerals on the list; Congress only required disclosure
and not a ban on the use of conflict minerals.89 Publicly traded companies must
“disclose annually, beginning with the [publicly traded company’s] first full
fiscal year that begins after the date of promulgation of such regulations,

84

Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010).
Ibrahim Sajalieu Bah, Ricardo Silva & Edna Udobong, Africa, 44 INT’L LAW. 577, 583 (2010)
(“Formerly known as Zaire, the Democratic Republic of Congo plunged into civil war after the death of its
longtime dictator, Mobutu Seseseko. Eastern Congo has been the hardest-hit region, as various rebel factions
battle each other and government forces for control of the mineral-rich nation.”).
86 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012); Dodd–Frank Act § 1502(e)(4) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78m
note).
87 Blood diamonds are largely addressed under the Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, 117
Stat. 631 (2003) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3901–3913).
88 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p).
89 Id. § 78m(p)(2).
85
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whether conflict minerals that are necessary . . . [for manufacturing] did
originate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”90
The Conflict Minerals Rule, whatever its limits, is not without its
burdens.91 Companies that use the minerals covered by the statutes must report
on the diligence taken on source and chain of custody of the minerals.92 Firms
must provide for an independent private sector audit of its report, in
accordance with SEC rules and Comptroller General standards.93 The report
must include a description of, among other things, the facilities used to process
the minerals, the country of origin of the minerals, and efforts to determine
location of origin of the minerals.94 And the companies cannot simply presume
that the minerals used come from somewhere else; they are to “conduct an
inquiry regarding the origin of its conflict minerals that is reasonably designed
to determine whether any of its conflict minerals originated in the Covered
Countries . . . and must perform the inquiry in good faith.”95 Companies that
make inadequate disclosures could be sued by shareholders or the SEC for
violations of the fraud rules that accompany financial disclosures.96
The report will be made publicly available to all. Ultimately, if the facts
require, the report must include a statement that the products of the firm are
“not DRC conflict free,” although the legality of requiring companies to make
such a statement has been controversial.97
90

15 U.S.C. § 78m(p).
For a comprehensive account of these burdens, and an argument that they were lower than expected,
albeit not low enough to particularly justify the rule, see Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment,
6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 32), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2548267 (“Given the
perfunctory effort and unexpectedly small number of filers, the true costs of compliance were likely far less
than critics warned.”). But see David M. Lynn, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Specialized Corporate Disclosure:
Using the Securities Laws to Address Public Policy Issues, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 327, 330–31 (2011) (noting
that issuers will “likely incur significant compliance costs in the development of the newly-required [sic]
information, with potentially only marginal benefits to investors”).
92 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 and 249b).
93 The SEC interpreted the purpose of this audit as follows: “[I]nvestors and other users will have some
assurance from an independent third party that the issuer’s due diligence framework, as set forth in the
Conflict Minerals Report, is designed in conformity with the relevant nationally or internationally recognized
due diligence framework.” Id.
94 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p). For a detailed description of the requirements, see Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240.13p-1, 249b.400 (2015).
95 Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, at 387 (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf.
96 Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 and 249b).
97 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The label ‘conflict free’ is a
metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to tell consumers that its
products are ethically tainted, even if they only indirectly finance armed groups.”), overruled by Am. Meat
91
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2. The International Context
Critically, the Conflict Minerals Rule is not just a rule for America. It also
represents an effort to develop a common approach internationally.98 Congress
has played a leading role in deterring firms from using Congolese conflict
minerals, a role it has shared with the United Nations.99 The rule is thus the
sort of claim about human rights that used to be left to international law; it
neglects that option in favor of delegation to an agency, through a domestic
statute, paired with an international campaign to join it.
Congress was the first body to consider acting against conflict minerals.
When it appeared that Congolese rebels financed their efforts through mineral
extraction, three senators, Sam Brownback (R–Kan.), Dick Durbin (D–Ill.),
and Russ Feingold (D–Wis.) introduced a number of bills over the course of
the four years preceding the adoption of the rules in Dodd–Frank—beginning
with Senate Bill 2125, the Democratic Republic of Congo Relief Security and
Democracy Promotion Act of 2006.100 The 109th Congress bill was joined by
others in the 110th and 111th Congress as well, before finally being enacted as
a part of Dodd–Frank.101
In 2008, the United Nations joined Congress. In that year, the U.N.
Security Council issued Resolution 1857. That resolution encouraged U.N.
member states “to take measures as they deem appropriate to ensure that
importers processing industries and consumers of Congolese mineral products
under their jurisdiction exercise due diligence on their suppliers and on the
origin of the minerals they purchase.”102 A U.N. Group of Experts on the
Democratic Republic of Congo stated in 2008 that
individuals and entities buying mineral output from areas of the
eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo with a strong rebel
Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (acknowledging “the possibility that some required
factual disclosures could be so one-sided or incomplete that they would not qualify as ‘factual and
uncontroversial’” (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 958 (D.C. Cir. 2013))).
98 As some commentators have requested. See Allison M. Blake, SEC Cannot Cleanse the Electronics
Industry Alone: “Blood Minerals” Mandatory Disclosure Legislation Effective Only If Applied Across the
Board, 39 J. CORP. L. 395, 410 (2014) (asserting that the conflict minerals rule “will not sufficiently address
humanitarian concerns unless other countries pass similar rules”).
99 See S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15 (Dec. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1376, ¶ 8 (Nov. 9, 2001).
100 S. 2125, 109th Cong. (later enacted in Pub. L. No. 109-456 (Dec. 22, 2006)).
101 See Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009, S. 891, 111th Cong. (2009); Conflict Coltan and Cassiterite
Act of 2008, S. 3058, 110th Cong. (2008); see also S.A. 2707, 111th Cong. (2009) (a bill similar to S. 891).
102 S.C. Res. 1857, supra note 99, ¶ 15. The UN Security Council denounced the use of natural resources
to prolong Congolese conflict in 2001. S.C. Res. 1376, supra note 99, ¶ 8.
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presence are violating the sanctions regime when they do not exercise
the due diligence to ensure that their mineral purchases do not
provide assistance to illegal armed groups.103

That group had announced concerns that large corporations were sourcing their
requirements through the purchase of conflict minerals even earlier.
American financial reform has been a catalyst, although the UN has played
its part. Since 2010, other countries have begun to implement the conflict
minerals rules patterned off the American initiative—and in all cases involving
the exact same four minerals sourced in the same part of the world, of which
Congress directed the SEC to mandate disclosures.104
As Galit Sarfaty has concluded, the Conflict Minerals Rule “has been
driving global norms.”105 In 2010, the parties to the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region, which included most of the countries designated in
Dodd–Frank, issued a Lusaka Declaration, observing that there were “endemic
conflicts and persistent insecurity caused by armed groups in the Great Lakes
Region financed through the illegal exploitation of natural resources and trade
in minerals, in particular Gold, Colombo-Tantalite, Wolframite and
Cassiterite,” and accordingly required supply chain management measures to
be taken by extractors of these minerals.106 In February 2012, after the passage
of Dodd–Frank, the Congo suspended two minerals companies for failing to
engage in this required supply chain monitoring.107

103

See S. 891, § 2.
For a discussion, see Ved P. Nanda, Conflict Minerals and International Business: United States and
International Responses, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 299 (2014) (“Dodd-Frank, Section 1502 has
indeed been a catalyst to international efforts addressing conflict minerals issues.”).
105 Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 108 (2014); see
also Jamie Darin Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford, Business, Human Rights, and the Promise of Polycentricity,
47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 483–87 (2014) (discussing national and international initiatives to limit the
use of conflict minerals).
106 Int’l Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Lusaka Declaration of the ICGLR Special Summit to
Fight Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources in the Great Lakes Region (2010), http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne/47143500.pdf. The interest in the issue started in 2006, when the ICGLR vowed “to put in place
regional rules and mechanisms for combating the illegal exploitation of natural resources which constitute a
violation of the States’ right of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.” Int’l Conference on the
Great Lakes Region, The Pact on Security, Stability and Development for the Great Lakes Region art. 9 (Dec.
2006), http://www.icglr.org/images/Pact%20ICGLR%20Amended%2020122.pdf (amended Nov. 2012).
107 Press Release, Global Witness, Congo Government Enforces Law to Curb Conflict Mineral Trade
(May 21, 2012), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Congo_government_enforces_law_to_
curb_conflict_minerals_trade.pdf.
104
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Initiatives that parallel Dodd–Frank, all specifying that the term “conflict
minerals” means the four covered by the American statute, have been
introduced in Canada,108 Australia,109 Hong Kong,110 and the European
Union.111
China has also issued supply chain transparency guidance,112 and one of the
rule sponsors declared on the floor of the Senate that “other nations are
following close behind.”113 The result is that “the Congress has emerged as a
world leader on conflict minerals reporting.”114 A timeline marking the
introduction of conflict minerals rules around the world shows that the United
States was a leader in introducing laws designed to address the conflict
minerals problem.

108 Conflict Minerals Act, H.C. C-486, 41st Parl. (2013) (Can.), http://www.parl.gc.ca/housepublications/
publication.aspx? language=e&mode=1&docid=6062040&file=4.
109 Austl. Dep’t of Foreign Aff. & Trade, Due Diligence Guidelines for the Responsible Supply Chain of
Minerals from Red Flag Locations to Mitigate the Risk of Providing Direct or Indirect Support for Conflict in
the Eastern Part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.dfat.gov.au/
international-relations/security/sanctions/sanctions-regimes/congo/Pages/due-diligence-guidelines-for-theresponsible-supply-chain-of-minerals-from-red-flag-locations-to-mitigate-the-risk-of-provi.aspx.
110 H.K. Stock Exch., Amendments to the Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange
of Hong Kong Limited (2010), http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrulesup/Documents/mb96_
miner.pdf (Chapter 18: Equity Securities, Mineral Companies).
111 Proposal For a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Setting up a Union System
for Supply Chain Due Diligence Self-Certification of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten,
Their Ores, and Gold Originating in Conflict Affected and High-Risk Areas, COM (2014) 111 final (Mar. 5,
2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152227.pdf.
112 The Chinese conflict minerals proposed rule has been issued by a state-affiliated body, the China
Chamber of Commerce of Minerals, Metals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters. It offers guidance on
conflict products generally, but suggests that the guidance was inspired by the conflict minerals rules
elsewhere and the OECD guidance. China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers
& Exporters, Guideline for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments 11 n.7, 12 n.8 (Mar. 6,
2014), http://www.chinacsrproject.org/Uploads/Events/%7B3F0A35CF-0801-447A-A0F0-DC355CFDE8B2%
7D_Draft_Guidance_PublicConsultation_ENG_20140310.pdf (draft guidance).
113 160 CONG. REC. S6,189–01 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2014) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
114 Id.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Introduction of CM Rules Around the World

A map shows how the United States has catalyzed a spread in the rules
which has recently reached Europe and China, meaning that the three largest
consumers of the minerals have signed on to some degree of supply chain
controls.
Figure 2: Date Conflict Minerals Rule Proposed
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Private companies as yet uncovered by this emerging global welter of rules
have also started to commit themselves to supply chain due diligence. The
promise by the Malaysia Smelting Corporation, the second-largest tin producer
in the world, that it “will not trade in cassiterite that directly or indirectly
finances or benefits armed groups in the DRC and/or adjoining countries,”
exemplifies this change.115
3. Conclusion
Through the Conflict Minerals Rule, the United States has turned to an
agency engaged in the development of soft rules designed to harmonize global
securities rules to do something similar in the name of the human rights of the
Congolese.116 The Conflict Minerals Rule is in fundamental part an effort to
spread particular mechanisms for the implementation of human rights values—
in this case, by reporting by large, internationally minded corporations—across
not just American firms but firms the world over.
Given its limitations, the Conflict Minerals Rule is probably best
understood as an experiment,117 based on the suspicion that American
companies that use these minerals are helping to fund dissident groups
interested in continuing a series of civil wars in and around the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
If it likes the results of the rule, Congress could conceivably pursue other,
similar goals through securities regulation; it is easy to imagine certifications
required for labor conditions in upstream factories, a broader approach to
filings for companies involved in a broader array of resource extraction, and
the like.
It is a somewhat limited ambition, and one that is duplicated with the
Resource Extraction Rule. But the caution inherent in the method chosen to
address human rights depredation in Africa should not detract from the
innovations. The agency chosen to pursue this rule is relatively insulated from

115 MSC Policy on Conflict Minerals, MALAY. SMELTING CORP. BERHAD, http://www.msmelt.com/abt_
policy.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
116 Although, to be sure, the Conflict Minerals Rule has its critics. See, e.g., Sudarsan Raghavan, In
Congo, Unintended Harm from a U.S. Law, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2014, at A1 (“The legislation, signed by
President Obama four years ago, set off a chain of events that has propelled millions of miners and their
families deeper into poverty.”).
117 Indeed, some research on the rule characterizes it precisely this way. See Schwartz, supra note 91
(manuscript at 32).
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presidential control, and the human rights being vindicated are not realized
through a traditional international law mechanism. Instead, the approach is to
delegate international norm enforcement to domestic agencies, and to
encourage other countries to empower their own domestic regulators to do the
same thing.
B. The Resource Extraction Rule
Dodd–Frank also requires the disclosure of all payments to governments in
exchange for resource extraction of a broad swath of minerals by publicly
listed energy and mining companies.118 Telling the world just how much
money foreign governments receive for those mineral rights is supposed to
serve two functions. It is meant to ensure the citizens of foreign countries will
better be able to monitor their governments to see if their country’s resources
are being used corruptly.119 It also is meant to deter firms from making
questionable payments to governments.120
This rule looks not just to the SEC to enforce human rights, but also to the
accountants, lawyers, and other gatekeepers who are supposed to monitor
corporate compliance, handle filings, and assess the internal controls of
publicly traded firms, and to bring them into this effort as well.
In adopting the Resource Extraction Rule, Congress signed the SEC up for
a global campaign, the so-called Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), organized by a non-governmental organization based in Britain, to
create a level global playing field with regard to resource extraction
transparency.121 The United States’s commitment to publicizing resource
extraction payments is only the second example of an OECD member signing
on to a rule that has heretofore largely been adopted by resource-rich, but per
capita poor, countries. As of January 2014, forty-nine countries have either
started or implemented the process of enacting transparency rules for resource
extraction payments.122 As Figure 3 shows, it is the poorest countries that
adopted the EITI earliest and have steadily continued to do so; the United
118

15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2012).
Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules for Resource Extraction Issuers Under Dodd–Frank Act
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-277.html.
120 Id.
121 EITI, FACT SHEET (Dec. 4, 2015), https://eiti.org/files/document/EITI_Factsheet_EN.pdf; What is the
EITI?, EITI, https://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Mar. 2, 2016); History of EITI, EITI, https://eiti.org/eiti/history
(last visited Feb. 6, 2016).
122 EITI Countries, EITI, https://eiti.org/countries (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
119
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States is a comparative Johnny-come lately, and Norway, the other wealthy
complier, was not in the first tranche of countries to do so.
Figure 3: Date Government Announces Commitment to EITI

As a matter of law, the Resource Extraction Rule requires the SEC to
require each resource extraction issuer to include in an annual report
of the resource extraction issuer information relating to any payment
made by the resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the resource
extraction issuer, or an entity under the control of the resource
extraction issuer to a foreign government or the Federal Government
for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals.123

It covers payments made to governments for exploration, extraction,
processing, export, and other significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or
minerals or any acquisition of a license for such activity.124 As with the
Conflict Minerals Rule, the Resource Extraction Rule requires a publicly
available report on payments made to any foreign authority on this issue, with

123

15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A).
“Under the final rules, ‘processing’ includes field processing activities, such as the processing of gas to
extract liquid hydrocarbons” but does not “include refining or smelting . . . [as] refining and smelting are not
specifically listed in Section 13(q).” Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67717, 104 SEC Docket
1796 (Nov. 13, 2012).
124
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the exception of so called de minimis payments or any payment (or series of
related payments), equal to or exceeding $100,000 during the most recent
fiscal year.125
Controversially, there is no exemption from the disclosure requirements,
not even where foreign law prohibits the disclosure, or when confidentiality
provisions in the contract to purchase the resources so provide.126
The rule reaches broadly in other ways. It does not only require disclosure
by those issuers engaged in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals; publicly traded companies must also disclose payments made by a
subsidiary or another entity controlled by the company.127 The types of
payments that must be disclosed include taxes, royalties, fees, production
entitlements, bonuses, dividends, and infrastructure improvements.128 It is
meant to be an inclusive, rather than limited, list. Because of this very broad
reach, among other reasons, the first iteration of the rule was withdrawn after
an adverse ruling by a federal court regarding the findings made to support the
breadth of the disclosure requirements.129
But the flexibility of the agency to depart from congressional instruction is
limited; Congress provided that “the Commission shall issue final rules that
require each resource extraction issuer” to report on their payments, as
opposed to letting the agency decide whether to require such disclosure after
its own consideration of the issue.130 It arguably ties the agency’s hands.
Like the Conflict Minerals Rule, the Resource Extraction Rule is embedded
in an international effort. Unlike conflict minerals, however, the United States
is a follower, rather than a leader, in the area. The statute itself bows to the

125

See id. at 14.
As the D.C. Circuit suggested, this aspect of the rule could amount to quite a confiscation. Am. Petrol.
Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[A]ssuming that four countries—Angola, Cameroon,
China, and Qatar—prohibit the disclosure of payment information, the Commission estimated that resource
extraction issuers operating in those countries could lose over $12.5 billion if forced to sell their assets.”).
127 See Press Release, supra note 119.
128 Fact Sheet: Disclosing Payments by Issuers Engaged in Resource Extraction, SEC, http://www.sec.
gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1365171492584 (last updated July 29, 2014).
129 See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013).
130 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2012) (setting forth disclosure requirements for conflict resources).
126
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EITI.131 This cross-border initiative originated in the United Kingdom. As EITI
has explained, the organization is responsible for a
global Standard to promote openness and accountable management of
natural resources. It seeks to strengthen government and company
systems, inform public debate, and enhance trust. In each
implementing country it is supported by a coalition of governments,
companies and civil society working together.132

In that sense, the Resource Extraction Rule reflects a cross-border human
rights initiative that is meant to develop civil society. And the EITI’s role in
devising the content of the rule is hardly hidden; it is referenced as the basis of
American action in the statute.133 As the sponsors of the Resource Extraction
Rule indicated, “The U.S. needs to take a leadership position in regard to the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.”134

131

“To the extent practicable, the rules . . . shall support the commitment of the Federal Government to
international transparency promotion efforts relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals.” Id. § 78m(q)(2)(E). The Final Rule specifically says in footnote 581 that
the final rules are generally consistent with the EITI, except where the language of Section 13(q)
clearly deviates from the EITI. In these instances, the final rules generally track the statute
because, on these specific points, we believe the statutory language demonstrates that Congress
intended the final rules to go beyond what is required by the EITI. In this regard, we view the
reporting regime mandated by Section 13(q) as being complementary to, rather than duplicative of,
host country transparency initiatives implemented under the EITI.
Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67717, at 161 n.581 (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/2012/34-67716.pdf.
132 What is the EITI?, EITI, https://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
133 “The new EU and US rules therefore complement, rather than replace, the EITI.” David Laurence,
David Gilmore & Rebecca Major, “Publish What You Pay,” LEXOLOGY (June 5, 2013), http://www.lexology.
com/library/detail.aspx?g=366b840f-2bab-4d4a-9791-a96ee39f7f62.
134 156 CONG. REC. S3,815 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Benjamin Cardin).
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The American adoption of the EITI might be seen as an effort to encourage
developed countries to adopt transparency principles designed to help
developing countries avoid corruption. Indeed, it is, as we have observed, only
the second wealthy country to commit to the initiative; but, as the conflict
minerals timeline suggests, its adoption of the rule will likely be joined by
other wealthy countries in the future.135 Figure 4 illustrates the degree to which
the United States and Norway represent wealthy outliers—and comparatively
late adopters—in the EITI movement.
Figure 4: EITI Countries: Time and Income

To be sure, the American endorsement of this global value is modest. Only
publicly traded resource firms need worry about the resource extraction rule;

135 The spread of transparency soft law norms has been a feature of the current era, with Transparency
International a soft law success, and other transparency initiatives important providers of standards in global
governance. For analyses, see Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1525–26, 1525 n.130 (2006) (discussing the advantage of global
anti-corruption norms, such as those offered by Transparency International); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 901 (2006) (describing, albeit with some skepticism, the way
transparency norms have been adopted by organizations bullish on the way it would help build “relations to the
wider global community”).
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private companies need not report.136 No one is banned from making high
payments to foreign governments, with little control over how that money is
spent. The only sanction for such payments, assuming they are adequately
disclosed, is the potential for shame if the payments look unwarranted or
directed to unappealing parts of the foreign government ruling over the
resource in question.137
Nonetheless, the endorsement does embody an American interest in doing
something about foreign corrupt practices. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
makes the payments of bribes illegal; the Resource Extraction Rule makes a
larger set of payments subject to disclosure (bribes already arguably must be
reported under the books and records component of the statute). In both cases,
the commitment to act against corruption abroad is the point of the exercise.
C. Evaluating Human Rights by Rule
Despite a degree of caution by Congress, the Conflict Minerals and
Resource Extraction Rules are an almost unprecedented effort to task an
American agency with the transmission of new efforts that can only be
characterized as designed to improve human rights. The SEC has engaged in
international relations before, but rarely in the service of human rights.138
Instead, its work has largely been efforts at international regulatory
cooperation, or the controversial extraterritorial application of American
securities laws.139

136 15 U.S.C. 78m(q)(1)(D) (“[T]he term ‘resource extraction issuer’ means an issuer that [] is required to
file an annual report with the [SEC].”).
137 But, to be sure, this sort of shaming is hardly uncommon in both international and in corporate law.
See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) (discussing the
phenomenon); Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International
Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 309 & n.178 (2011) (analyzing shaming in the human-rights context).
138 It is a veteran of securities regulatory cooperation, which is principally done through the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The SEC was a charter member of the organization, and
has played an active role since its founding in 1984. The regulatory cooperation pursued by IOSCO has been
limited, but securities regulators have agreed on some basic principles of market supervision, and have agreed
to assist one another by exchanging information that could help to prove up enforcement actions. For an
analysis, see David Zaring, supra note 82, at 561–65.
139 For discussions of the SEC’s extraterritorial reach, see A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts
Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 142 (2011) (analyzing Dodd–Frank’s endorsement of
some extraterritorial SEC activities); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2362 (1998) (criticizing the “ever-expanding extraterritorial reach
of U.S. securities regulation”).
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It has, to be sure, campaigned to see some American anti-fraud innovations
adopted by regulators in foreign countries. In particular, the agency has pushed
anti-bribery laws that do work similar to that done by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act;140 the United Kingdom and other countries have obliged by
passing their own laws, and the OECD has made the adoption of anti-bribery
provisions as a condition of membership.141 The United Kingdom has been
particularly committed to the cause, enacting in 2013 a law even more
restrictive than that enforced by the SEC.142
The SEC has also successfully persuaded most sophisticated economies to
adopt rules against insider trading; an increasing number of these agencies are
actually enforcing the rules, as Abraham Newman and David Bach have
shown.143
The Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction Rules look a little like
those earlier campaigns against insider trading and bribery. But unlike the
insider trading rules, both the Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction Rules
are principally designed to offer benefits to the citizens of foreign nations,
rather than to investors in the United States. And unlike the anti-bribery rules,
Dodd–Frank’s human rights rules are more engaged with international
governance. The Conflict Minerals Rule is meant to inspire other countries to
join the United States in addressing, in a novel way, the problem of external
funding of civil wars, while the Resource Extraction Rule explicitly is based on
140 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, amended by Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, and International Anti-Bribery
and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, § 2, 112 Stat. 3302.
141 The OECD has explained that “[t]he 34 OECD member countries and seven non-member countries—
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Latvia, Russia, and South Africa—have adopted this Convention.”
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
OECD http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2015). As
Erik Chaffee has explained, the convention “requires countries ratifying it to implement laws criminalizing
bribery of foreign officials.” Eric C. Chaffee, The Role of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other
Transnational Anti-Corruption Laws in Preventing or Lessening Future Financial Crises, 73 OHIO ST. L.J.
1283, 1292 (2012); see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2012), http://www.
oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/40272933.pdf. For an analysis of the
convention, see Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. CORP. L. 325,
339–40 (2013).
142 See Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (U.K.); Jon Jordan, The Need for A Comprehensive International Foreign
Bribery Compliance Program, Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Bribery Environment, 117 PENN
ST. L. REV. 89, 96–97 (2012) (analyzing the British statute).
143 David Bach & Abraham L. Newman, Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic Policy
Convergence: Evidence from Insider Trading Regulation, 64 INT’L ORG. 505, 520 (2010) (showing how these
laws moved from the United States to the rest of the world).
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an international good-governance effort that comes not from the United States
but from Europe.
Regulatory cooperation on human rights issues now appears to be part of
the mission of the SEC, and it is one that Congress could add to in the future. It
is possible that action by government agencies, if done on the basis of opinio
juris could amount to evidence of customary international law.
But these rules look more rooted in a different sort of governance. They use
an agency elsewhere in the statute tasked with international regulatory
cooperation. They hearken to a soft law initiative by a non-governmental
organization, as well as to studies conducted by a U.N. agency. No treaty
requires their promulgation, and customary international law has not, in the
past, posed disclosure obligations on would-be bribers or funders of conflict.
Why has Congress required the SEC to intervene in the foreign activities of
American companies? Karen Woody has argued that “[t]he regulation and
enforcement of section 1502 [(the Conflict Minerals Rule)] falls well outside
of the SEC’s mandate” or expertise.144 Jeffrey Schwartz largely agrees; in his
view, “The basic approach—relying on companies to name and shame
themselves when there are high costs and low benefits for doing so—is an
inherently weak starting point.”145 Galit Sarfaty takes a different view; she has
argued that “[s]ecurities law is an innovative strategy that has the potential to
significantly further the movement for corporate accountability.”146 Sarfaty
argues that the risks are consistent with the kind of things investors should care
about, because “human rights risks are material for investors and there are
long-term costs to companies for not reporting.”147 Both Sarfaty and Woody
144 Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role as Diplomatic and
Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2012); see also Marcia Narine, From Kansas to
the Congo: Why Naming and Shaming Corporations Through the Dodd–Frank Act’s Corporate Governance
Disclosure Won’t Solve a Human Rights Crisis, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 362 (2012) (“If the government
chooses to engage in future human rights governance legislation for businesses, the Dodd–Frank Act should
not serve as the model.”); Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate Strategy,
35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 87, 106–08, 125–37 (2014) (offering suggestions for the implementation of the
conflict minerals provision that would improve their effectiveness); Celia R. Taylor, Conflict Minerals and
SEC Disclosure Regulation, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 106 (2012), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/01/Taylor-Conflict-Minerals.pdf (“The rules that the SEC has currently proposed are overly
draconian, and strict enforcement of them will put the SEC into the position of dictating not only rules of
corporate governance by indirectly dictating daily corporate operation themselves . . . .”).
145 Schwartz, supra note 91, at 35.
146 Galit A. Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97, 101 (2013);
Woody, supra note 144, at 1327.
147 Sarfaty, supra note 146, at 101.
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are worried about American exceptionalism; Sarfaty recommends
“international regulatory convergence to relieve possible damage to a
company’s competitive advantage due to increased costs associated with social
disclosure.”148
Congress was worried about this too. The sponsors of the Resource
Extraction Rule presented the amendment with the statement that they
“encourage the President to work with members of the G8 and the G20 to
promote similar disclosures through their exchanges and their jurisdictions.”149
III. ASSESSING FINANCIAL REFORM’S INTERNATIONALISM
This section first reflects on the way that regulatory cooperation and the
tasking of agencies to pursue global values has supplanted a particular kind of
international law—customary international law. It then turns to the domestic
implications of financial reform, which changes the actors of international
governance and also pushes for ethical standards for American companies that
have international connections.
A. The Death of Custom?
Customary international law—the unwritten rules that are meant to bind
states but that have never been memorialized through an international
agreement—has turned into doctrine that is both exceedingly controversial and
totally stymied. American courts, led by the Supreme Court, approach it with
suspicion.150 Many scholars have argued that it is not really law, and certainly

148

Id. at 102.
156 CONG. REC. S8,318 (2010).
150 A case brought alleging customary international law violations led the Supreme Court to conclude that
the jurisdictional vehicle for the cases bars any “case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations
occurring outside the United States.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); see also
United States v. Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[C]ustomary international law is,
by its nature, difficult to determine . . . .”); Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1015
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ustomary international law—as the term itself implies—is created by the general customs
and practices of nations and therefore does not stem from any single, definitive, readily-identifiable source. All
of these characteristics give the body of customary international law a ‘soft, indeterminate character.’”
(quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2003))); Sampson v. Fed. Republic of
Ger., 250 F.3d 1145, 1156 (7th Cir. 2001) (worrying that certain uses of “customary international law . . .
would allow for a major, open-ended expansion of our jurisdiction into an area with substantial impact on the
United States’ foreign relations” and should therefore be avoided).
149
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not justiciable law;151 others think that it is nothing more than the bidding of
powerful states encompassed in a charade of lawfulness.152
Soft law cooperation through agencies has increasingly taken on the
responsibilities that used to be handled through customary international law, as
defining it and applying it has become more difficult. It does so in particular in
those areas where regulators hold sway. Customary international law may still
guide diplomats, but in those areas where agencies set American policy, one
can see how regulatory cooperation through soft law will hold more and more
sway in these growing aspects of international governance.
One sort of custom has drawn particular suspicion—the sort that features
claims about emerging international rules regarding matters of import, but also
of controversy, such as the protection of human rights or the environment.153
These rules might be termed “positive rights” rules, because they purport to
afford international legal entitlements to people, or, occasionally, non-persons,
that previously did not enjoy them.
They are always controversial. Unwritten custom has been cited as a reason
to permit anticipatory offensive intervention in a case where a state is
suspected of fostering international terrorism, despite the vociferous objections
of members of the Security Council to such a doctrine; this claim underlaid the

151 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 902 (2007) (arguing that “federal
common law relating to CIL be grounded in, conform to, and not exceed the contours of what the political
branches have authorized”); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 665, 671 (1986) (“[C]ustomary international law has not traditionally been applied by American
courts, nor should it be. . . . [M]y analysis suggests the need for a broader revision of the traditional status of
customary international law.”); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases,
20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 44–48 (1995) (arguing that applying customary international law in federal courts is
inconsistent with constitutional values).
152 See, e.g., Michael Byers, The Shifting Foundations of International Law: A Decade of Forceful
Measures Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 21, 32 (2002) (“[P]owerful states have always had a
disproportionate influence on customary law-making . . . .”); Jan Klabbers, The Curious Condition of Custom,
8 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 29, 30–31 (2002) (“[C]ustomary international law is somewhat unbalanced, tilting too
much in favour of a handful of traditionally powerful states and towards the views of international lawyers that
live in the most powerful nations.”); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1999) (“The content of CIL seems to track the interests of
powerful nations.”).
153 As Emily Kadens and Ernest Young have observed, “a model of adherence to settled practices may be
antithetical to what human rights advocates hope to achieve.” Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How
Customary Is Customary International Law?, 54 WM & MARY L. REV. 885, 914 (2013).
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American invasion of Iraq in 2003.154 It has formed the basis for a claim
requiring the preservation of whales based on the notion of their right to life,
despite the strong commitment of many states—and cultures within states, for
that matter—not just to ignore whales, but to actively hunt them; these claims
have launched a variety of performative activism by non-governmental
organizations such as Greenpeace.155 Some argue that customary international
law has rendered the death penalty—a practice used by most nations—illegal
under international law, a claim that the state of Texas has rejected out of
hand.156
Suspicions of positive rights rules have led to skepticism about a second
sort of custom, the one premised on the idea that the international legal system
must include some principles that—even if they are not reduced to the terms of
a duly executed treaty—can help make the international system work.157 We
might think of these rules as “cooperation facilitating” rules, and they should,
in theory, be uncontroversial because their purpose is not to build a new
architecture of rights with which all countries must comply, but rather only to
provide the foundation on which further international cooperation might be
constructed.
An example of this second kind of customary international law lies in the
classic rules regarding diplomatic immunity.158 Diplomatic immunity, under
customary international law, requires that a “receiving State shall treat [a
diplomat] with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any
attack on his person, freedom or dignity.”159 The norms about the protections
of ambassadors and consuls facilitated state-to-state interaction and created an

154 See John Alan Cohan, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory Self-Defense in
Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 283, 288, 301 (2003).
155 See Anthony D’Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L L.
21 (1991).
156 John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, and the
Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195, 254 & n.425 (2009) (making this argument).
157 See Kadens & Young, supra note 153, at 887 (“[C]ustomary international law derives its appeal not
only from a fear that it may be the only game in town but also from a widely held sense that it is, well,
customary.”).
158 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 345–59 (3d ed. 1979).
159 This is the definition set forth in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which sought to
reflect customary international law understandings of diplomatic immunity. See Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations art. 29, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; see also 767 Third Ave.
Assocs. v. Permanent Mission, 988 F.2d 295, 299–300 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations as a codification of historical, customary practices of nations).
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opportunity and modality for discourse, which in turn could lead to other, more
specific forms of cooperation in more narrow issue-areas.
But diplomatic immunity is only one of a number of examples of
cooperation-facilitating customary international law. The requirement that
local remedies be exhausted prior to creating an international dispute has a
conflict-mediating function (which, of course, the rules against harming
diplomats also facilitate).160 If national remedies were sufficient recourse for
the citizens of one country harmed by the actions of another, there would be no
need to make an international incident out of it. Relatedly, the rules of state
responsibility were meant to clarify when acts could be attributed to states and,
therefore, set the ground rules for violations of international law and offering
rules of the road for when it could be invoked.161
The positive rights sort of customary international law, the sort involving
bold claims about human rights, the environment, the laws of war, and so on,
has been due for a reevaluation. The idea that there is a discoverable
international legal doctrine, consisting of unwritten norms and requiring hotly
disputed controversies to be resolved against the will of holdout countries in a
particular way, has launched many an implausible campaign, either in the
academy, or by law reformers. The problem with arguments that customary
international law requires that whales be protected, that the death penalty be
abolished, and that countries be permitted to attack potential terrorists
wherever they may be found, is that a significant number, and in some cases a
vast majority, of countries and the citizens in them disagree that these rights
exist. These claims—often noble efforts—about the legal obligations of
countries to protect values that many of them have never deigned to honor in
practice, other than the possible practice of signing on to some nonbinding
international statement that they have no intention of honoring at home, have
always been a controversial, and ultimately destabilizing, claim about
international law.162
160 Note, The Alien Tort Statute, Forum Shopping, and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Norm,
121 HARV. L. REV. 2110, 2124 (2008) (assessing the role of the “CIL norm of exhaustion” in domestic law).
161 See, e.g., George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 541, 553 (2005) (arguing that “the selection among multiple equilibria may also be understood as a
separate coordination game”). The laws of the sea arguably had this function as well by creating common
standards for figuring out where the sea begins, where states could exercise control over the sea, and where the
delimitations of that control were meant to end. See Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559,
595, 600–01 n.134 (2002) (discussing the purpose of the International Convention on the Law of the Sea).
162 The list of academic articles making broad claims about customary international law is a long one, and,
to be sure, often these claims are unlikely to be adopted by an international tribunal. But to just take the right
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These types of claims about custom have led many legal scholars and
jurists to conclude that identifying customary international law and making
claims about what is required is an exercise rooted more in hope than
experience.163 That in turn has led them to argue that while customary
international law perhaps has produced some unobjectionable rules of the road
in the past, it is no longer providing such a service. Joel Trachtman has
proclaimed “the obsolescence of customary international law,” given that most
of these rules have been codified through a treaty in one way or another.164
And the list of high profile critics of the current state of customary
international law is long.165
To be sure, almost no one acts as if customary international law is a null
set: if the United States was not able to rely on customary international law as
a mechanism to give it an approach to treaty interpretation consistent with that
set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,166 then it would
have a difficult time concluding treaties of any sort.167
But the United States has been particularly skeptical about the controversial
and tendentious efforts to push the doctrine beyond what state practice
obviously permits.168 Many American scholars have accordingly concluded

to education—a right afforded only some of the world’s citizens, and one that could be delivered through the
private sector, see, for example, Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under
the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 616–
22 (1992) (positing a right to state-supported education derived from customary international law); Connie de
la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Principle or Customary International Legal Right?,
11 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 37, 59–60 (1994) (“International law . . . provides an additional basis for the claim
that education is necessary to ensure effective participation in society.”).
163 See supra notes 149–57 and accompanying text.
164 Joel Trachtman, The Obsolescence of Customary International Law (Oct. 21, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2512757.
165 See supra notes 149–57 and accompanying text.
166 While the United States is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, its
diplomats have said that much of the treaty’s provisions “constitute customary international law on the law of
treaties.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/
faqs/70139.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).
167 Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 749
(2014) (describing the “cumbersome ratification processes that domestic law can require of traditional
treaties”). The United States has also engaged in campaigns to change customary international law, as it did
with the language in its Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). In the Model BIT, both parties sign on to
language stating that “fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security” for investments is required
by customary international law; this suggests that it takes the institution seriously enough to negotiate for
claims about what it requires. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5, ¶ 1, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRES., https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
168 See infra note 174.
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that customary international law should be viewed as a narrow category of law
recognized by American courts only when Congress or the president adopts it
as such,169 if it even exists at all.170
Binding custom, on this understanding, is dead or dying, and certainly
incapable of innovation.
As custom has calcified, soft law has exploded. Soft law is the general term
used to refer to international governance efforts that do not meet the standards
of binding obligation. The most interesting form of this soft law consists of the
efforts by domestic agencies who have the power to enact binding rules at
home to coordinate their activity with their foreign counterparts. This type of
soft law has been used to set some of the most important standards in global
finance, and also has made progress in areas of food safety,171 competition
law,172 and other areas in which domestic consumers are affected by the
globalized nature of the businesses that cater to them,173 leaving regulators
struggling to catch up unless they coordinate their efforts internationally.
The argument in this Article is that soft law is increasingly doing the things
that custom used to do, both in providing the sorts of basic rules that makes
global governance manageable, and, intriguingly, also providing the means for
pursuing the sorts of human rights innovations that have made customary
international law controversial. This is particularly the case in the
contemporary practice of the United States, whose courts have increasingly
stopped trying to discern and apply customary international law, but whose

169 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870 (1997) (noting that “in the absence of federal
political branch authorization, [customary international law] is not a source of federal law”).
170 See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449 (2000)
(discussing how customary international law is not a legitimate source of international law).
171 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes Steps to Help Ensure the Safety of Imported
Food (July 26, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm362610.htm. The
initiative was based on embrace of foreign regulatory supervision of some aspects of food chain for American
consumers. Id. (announcing “global solutions to food safety so that whether you serve your family food grown
locally or imported you can be confident that it is safe”).
172 The International Competition Network (ICN) is comprised of antitrust regulators from around the
world; it is a common example of a soft law network. For overviews of the ICN, see Eleanor M. Fox,
Linked-in: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 INT’L LAW. 151, 169 (2009) (“[T]he ICN’s
output may develop into soft law with some influence.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of
Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1041 (2011) (describing the ICN as “a soft law institutional
alternative”).
173 Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 323, 330 (2008) (noting the “conclusion of hundreds of multilateral soft-law instruments” to date).
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agencies vindicate informal international norms with their new foreign
policies.174
There are advantages to the ascent of soft law over custom. It is flexible
and yet capable of precision, more so than customary international law, and
soft law’s problems—ones of legitimacy and, at least superficially, of
compliance—are problems shared by customary international law. Soft law is
more precise than customary international law in that it includes nonbinding
agreements that can be quite specific, instead of claims reconciling various
practices of states similar in degree, but not in particular. Soft law, made by
agencies of their own initiative—and often concluded by international
agreement before even being submitted to domestic notice and comment and
judicial review—can look like an imperfect form of good governance.175 But
customary international law—evidenced by state practice but not necessarily
by any sort of democratic process—is no easy remedy to the democracy
deficit. And, as I have argued elsewhere, soft law is increasingly paired with
more routinized administrative procedure.176
But there are other facets of the shift in emphasis that are also important.
Soft law is being created by different parts of the government than is
customary international law. That is, it is agencies, rather than trade and
foreign relations diplomats familiar with international regulatory cooperation,
who do the important work in regulatory soft law. Customary international
law, and the American position on whether it applies or does not, is the
province of the State Department.177 If soft law is replacing calcified custom,

174 “Advocates who have argued to American courts that customary international law trumps domestic
norms report a ‘blank stare phenomenon’—that is, extreme judicial skepticism about the domestic force of
customary law.” Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L
L. 365, 383 (2002).
175 David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 63
(2013) (questioning whether “basic questions about whether notice and comment requirements are met if the
important policymaking was done at the international level”).
176 David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L.
547, 579 (2005) (“[F]inancial regulatory cooperation has exhibited a notable impetus towards the
proceduralization of its products.”).
177 At least, this argument has been made by Philip Trimble. Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of
Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 730 (1986) (“[T]he United States government
interaction with emerging customary international law may be limited to the State Department . . . .”). And
possibly also by the courts secondarily, as the history of the Alien Tort Statute has suggested. See, e.g.,
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that “courts may fashion domestic common
law remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law”).
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the development marks a shift in the parts of the government that are creating
and applying international rules.178
Financial reform illustrates the new centrality of soft law to American
foreign policy. It is a centerpiece of American free trade efforts.179 The
Chamber of Commerce, for example, has come out in favor of the Executive
Branch’s efforts to promote international regulatory cooperation by its
agencies.180 The National Association of Manufacturers has endorsed the new
effort to create multilateral trade agreements with partners in the European
Union and across the Pacific.181 For these business groups, a trade deal “is only
worth doing if the regulatory side is covered,” as former trade official Shaun
Donnelly has said.182 Indeed, much of these negotiations might be understood
as an effort by American business, with the support of the government, to get
European and Asian regulators to adopt American principles of notice and
comment, as the efforts to create standardized administrative processes in the

178 If soft law is doing what custom used to do, is soft law becoming customary—that is binding—
international law? It is of course possible that the transition from soft law to custom could occur. But it is
worth noting the differences. Widespread agency practice could certainly exist in parallel, and just because that
practice is coordinated by the agencies does not necessarily make it part of opinio juris. Soft law practitioners
regularly declaim its legal bindingness, and there is, of course, no effort to ratify agency positions more
broadly across other government organs. American securities regulators have persuaded their foreign
counterparts, for example, to ban insider trading and to forbid corporate executives from paying bribes to
foreign government officials. See, e.g., Bach & Newman, supra note 43 (discussing the spread of insider
trading rules); Stephen H. Willard & Bonnie H. Weinstein, International Investment, Development, and
Privatization, 34 INT’L LAW. 485, 491–92 (2000) (discussing the spread of international anti-bribery
initiatives); Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the American Conference
Institute’s 28th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crmspeech-1211161.html (“[W]e in the United States are in a unique position
to spread the gospel of anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery laws more
vigorously than we do.”). But no one has argued that these rules now amount to customary international law.
179 Zaring, supra note 30.
180 There is an entire segment of the Chamber of Commerce dedicated to the alignment of regulatory
efforts across nations. Global Regulatory Cooperation, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://www.
uschamber.com/global-regulatory-cooperation (last visited Feb. 28, 2016).
181 Public Comments Concerning the Proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, NAT’L
ASS’N MFRS. (May 10, 2013), http://www.nam.org/Issues/Trade/NAM-Comments-on-the-Launch-of-U_S_EU-Trade-Negotiations-(TTIP)/. See generally IEAP-01 International Trade Policy, NAT’L ASS’N MFRS.,
http://old.nam.org/Issues/Official-Policy-Positions/International-Economic-Affairs-Policy/IEAP-01International-Trade-Policy.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2016) (“[T]he NAM also believes that bilateral and
regional agreements have an important role in opening markets for American manufacturers.”).
182 See Regulation—None of Our Business?, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2013/12/regulation-none-our-business.
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Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
attest.183
There are some things that soft law does not do well: It is not a paragon of
administrative governance with regard to transparency and accountability.184 In
some cases, it is easy to ignore.185 But compared to the development of
customary international law, soft law’s problems look more like features than
like bugs.
Soft law’s limitations are real, but other forms of international
governance—especially customary international law—have always suffered
from similar claims of weakness. Both it and soft law are difficult to
enforce.186 Customary international law has problems with legitimacy; part of
the lack of legitimacy stems from the opaque nature of the source of the law.187
That opacity is at least as limited as that of soft law.
To be sure, traditional international law has always been something to take
seriously—more seriously than have its many critics.188 Treaties are important,
even if difficult to conclude, and there is still a role in foreign relations for
customary international law. But in the new global governance era, American
engagement abroad is likely not just to be driven through law or politics, but
instead through different kinds of institutions. Financial reform exemplifies the
way that informal arrangements can do the work that legal systems used to do.
These institutions look legal, engage the attentions of lawyers, and write and
enforce rules that look like the rules one would see in code of regulations.

183 “Long Way to Go” on Regulatory Cooperation Talks in TTIP—EU Official, BORDERLEX (Feb. 17,
2015), http://www.borderlex.eu/long-way-go-regulatory-cooperation-talks-ttip-eu-official/ (discussing an EU
official’s statement that “Washington has also asked Europe to adopt the US system of ‘notice and
comment’”).
184 Or at least many soft law institutions began that way, although they have since improved. See Zaring,
supra note 16.
185 John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 1259, 1268 (2014) (“[B]ecause non-binding soft law is unenforceable, it is easier for an adversely
affected nation to defect and ignore its prior commitments.”).
186 “Customary international law is difficult to enforce and maintain.” John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the
New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: The Risks of Refuting the Treaty, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 49
(1995).
187 See Trimble, supra note 151, at 716–17; see also Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy
Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. 399, 438 (2011) (“[T]here are legitimacy problems associated with relying on customary international law
because there can be disagreement among states about what exactly the custom is, since custom is continually
evolving and is not a codified body of law.”).
188 See supra notes 135–37, 164–65 and accompanying text.
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Their importance to American financial reform suggests that the distinctions
between what law used to do and what governments can do now are only likely
to blur further.
Accordingly, there are reasons to consider embracing the new role of soft
law in protecting human rights, as well as in being reminded of its critical
importance in facilitating conversation. By doing many of the things that
customary international law has done in the past, soft law is a reminder that—
while the need for international cooperation is still vital—the new means will
make the quasi-legal product of international cooperation look different than it
did in the past.
B. The Domestic Implications of Financial Reform’s Internationalism
1. Dethroning the Sole Organ?
Financial reform also marks a change in the location of international
policymaking within the American government, away from the President and
diplomats, and toward Congress and regulators. The executive’s importance in
foreign policy will not be undone by statutes like Dodd–Frank, but these
statutes do reflect a more pluralistic turn to the actors who matter in the
conduct of foreign relations.189
Foreign policy used to be the province of the President and his Secretary of
State. Indeed, much of foreign relations law is meant to establish the primacy,
within limits, of the executive in dealing with international issues. The
so-called “sole organ” doctrine, which allocates responsibility over foreign
affairs to the President so that the country speaks with a single voice on foreign
policy, exemplifies this perspective.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., Justice George Sutherland
described “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of
Congress.”190 Although the legitimacy and reach of this power has been
189

Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
190 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (citation omitted). Justice George Sutherland borrowed the term “sole organ”
from a speech by John Marshall in the House of Representatives in 1800, see id. at 319, and it reflects a
concept with roots in both international and constitutional law. See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the
Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1012–15, 1029 (2013).
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contested,191 and I have elsewhere argued that the sole organ doctrine could be
used in a way to bolster the position of agencies,192 the emphasis of the
doctrine used to be on the President. The idea was that the President’s foreign
affairs power matters for diplomatic interactions with other nations, given that
the President’s diplomatic sources, combined with the often “highly necessary”
need for secrecy, left him better positioned than, say, Congress to conduct
international negotiations.193
But Dodd–Frank is a creature of Congress. It allocates responsibility for
international relations to agencies, and not the State Department. Moreover,
most of its delegates are so-called independent agencies, meaning that the
Executive Branch has limited control over them.194
The Federal Reserve, which is funded through its open market operations,
rather than through budgets suggested by the President and voted on in
Congress, is particularly insulated, and plays an important role in the
implementation of Dodd–Frank.195 It is perhaps the most independent of
American agencies. The SEC and FDIC also enjoy freedom from the
requirements of White House supervision. They are not obligated to obtain the
approval of the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
before passing regulatory rules.196 Their commissioners enjoy tenure absent
cause for removal, and so are thought to be less susceptible to presidential
control.197 And, of course, it is these independent agencies that have been
charged with responsibilities for international cooperation under Dodd–Frank,
191 Harold Koh, for example, has criticized Curtiss-Wright and remarked that “[a]mong government
attorneys, Justice Sutherland’s lavish description of the president’s powers is so often quoted that it has come
to be known as the ‘“Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right” cite.’” HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990).
192 Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 167.
193 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 320–24 (citing historical sources for this proposition).
194 Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE
L.J. 679, 723 n.230 (1989) (noting the difference between “agencies that are clearly within the Executive
Branch, the top officials of which serve at the pleasure of the President” and “independent agencies, whose
heads are insulated from direct presidential control by ‘for cause’ removal provisions”).
195 David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
157, 173–74 (2015); see PAULINE SMALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20826, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 1 (2010) (discussing the factors that contribute to this independence).
196 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Introduction to the OIRA 30th Anniversary Conference, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 6 (2011) (discussing critics of this rule).
197 Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 984 (2008) (describing the SEC and the FDIC, among other
agencies, as “led by appointees who serve fixed terms and typically can be removed by the President only for
cause”).
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and are members of the FSOC.198 Even the component of the Department of
Treasury involved with bank supervision, an important component of Dodd–
Frank, enjoys independence within the context of the Executive Branch.199 The
new agency created by Dodd–Frank, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, was made so starkly independent of executive oversight that some
legal academics think it unconstitutionally divested from presidential
control.200
The result is a delegation to a different breed of international policy
makers. International regulatory cooperation is global governance done by
regulators, rather than diplomats, and, at least in this case, by agencies as
responsive, for the most part, to Congress as they are to the President. There
may be some doctrinal advantages to this novel sort of delegation. Although
the question is nuanced, it may be possible that the choice to make soft law
rather than to pursue custom will engage courts more in reviewing soft law
agreements, once enacted at home through ordinary administrative procedure,
than they would be if diplomatic negations were the subject.
Why might Congress and independent agencies usurp the traditionally
executive role in foreign policy? There will be some limits to this power to
delegate away from the Executive. The D.C. Circuit has suggested that a
multilateral treaty that could be amended through some post-ratification
mechanism might be unconstitutional, and, of course, Congress could not
simply delegate all lawmaking authority to the United Nations.201 The

198 See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327,
330 (2013) (“The dominant paradigm in the U.S. financial regulatory apparatus has long centered on
independent agencies like the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”).
199 The OCC was made an independent agency by Dodd–Frank itself. For a discussion, see Catherine M.
Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 555–56 (2012) (noting that “pursuant to [Dodd–
Frank], OCC is classified as an independent agency”). To be sure, the Department of the Treasury, whose
secretary is without doubt the President’s man, plays an important role in both the statute and its international
relations component.
200 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd–Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too
Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 171 (2014) (characterizing the constitutional case against
the CFPB as “surprisingly strong” and arguing that “[i]t would be far better to fix these [constitutional]
problems now by appropriate legislative amendment”). A number of state attorneys general and others have
filed suit on, among other things, this theory of unconstitutionality, albeit so far have been unable to establish
standing and ripeness. See State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 165–66 (D.D.C. 2013),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part 795 F.3d 48.
201 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“If the ‘decisions’ [further agreements
made after the treaty was ratified] are ‘law’—enforceable in federal court like statutes or legislative rules—
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functional answer to the question might lie in the difficulties with doing
foreign policy the way the Executive Branch used to do it, by creating treaties
and by using the instruments of international law to the country’s best
advantage.
It is difficult to make international law that way. Congress has essentially
ceased ratifying treaties, especially multilateral treaties that establish either
human rights or global governance mechanisms.202 Both it and the courts have
approached customary international law with skepticism.203 Customary
international law is, if anything, just as hard to create, and subject to just as
skeptical a reception. There is less functional reason to prefer presidential
control when that control over foreign policy is not likely to lead to binding
international commitments. In comparison to treaty negotiation and diplomatic
statements about the requirement of law, the only semi-binding international
commitment that can be made by agencies looks like an effective alternative.
Because soft law agreements constitute a lessened form of international
commitment relative to treaties or executive agreements, they can be
negotiated and renegotiated with greater ease and violated with lower
reputational costs—and, therefore, they can potentially contain stronger
substantive provisions.204 In the human rights context, for example, the choice
to make the Helsinki Accords—a Cold War-era document that included
provisions related to the respect for freedom of conscience, thought, freedom,
or belief—a soft law agreement, not only facilitated greater state acceptance

then Congress either has delegated lawmaking authority to an international body or authorized amendments to
a treaty without presidential signature or Senate ratification, in violation of Article II of the Constitution.”).
202 With the possible exception of tax treaties, treaties with European Union countries harmonizing
existing bilateral investment treaties with European Union law, and mutual legal assistance treaties. Jean
Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 275–76 (2012) (“[T]he Senate almost
always advises and consents to these treaties. Of the fifty-one tax, extradition, MLAT, and EU harmonizing
treaties mentioned above, the Senate has advised and consented to forty-nine . . . .”).
203 See supra note 174.
204 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 8, at 423 (arguing that soft law arrangements are often “preferable on
[their] own terms” because they give states a way to protect their sovereignty, deal with uncertainty, and
facilitate compromise); Guzman, Design, supra note 14, at 611 (noting that “soft law represents a choice by
the parties to enter into a weaker form of commitment” and emphasizing the trade-off between the credibility
of a state’s commitments and the costs of a violation); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International
Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 582–83 (2005) (distinguishing between the concepts of “pledge” and
“contract” and arguing that the preference for the contract form “often unduly weakens the substance and
structure of multilateral agreements” because states will hedge against their own noncompliance by weakening
the monitoring mechanisms or “watering down” commitments).
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but also produced an agreement with clearer and more specific substantive
provisions than those found in many hard law human rights treaties.205
Perhaps even more importantly, soft law agreements have the advantage of
avoiding the cumbersome ratification processes that domestic law can require
of traditional treaties.206 In the United States, hard law agreements above a
certain threshold of significance require strong support from the legislature:
either the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate under the Treaty
Clause of the Constitution or the approval of a majority of both Houses of
Congress as a congressional–executive agreement.207
Kal Raustiala is one of a number of observers who has suggested that states
turn to regulatory cooperation where the transaction costs of alternative legal
approaches, such as treaties, are high.208 And the costs of those alternatives
grow ever higher. As Jacob Cogan has shown, formal treaty conclusion has
become a rather demanding exercise: “Whereas once international law
substantially deferred to states in the enactment and implementation of
individual duties, it now specifies those duties more and more, and leaves less
and less room for state discretion.”209
Moreover, the delegation to agencies reflects a technocratic hope for
international cooperation rather than an embrace of the political means of
coordination that is practiced through the State Department.
The President himself has recognized the importance of the foreign policy of
regulators with an executive order encouraging the administrative regulators
within the Executive Branch to engage in international regulatory cooperation
wherever possible.210
International progress is difficult to make through diplomatic means. This
might particularly be seen to be the case in human rights, where the prospects
of the ratification of a big global convention on environmental rights, or

205 See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1840–41,
1840 n.30 (2002) (comparing the clear and detailed rules of the “soft law” Helsinki Accords with the “more
ambiguous prescriptions” of the “hard law” International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights).
206 Galbraith & Zaring, supra note 167, at 749 (describing the “cumbersome ratification processes that
domestic law can require of traditional treaties”).
207 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 479, 584 (4th ed. 2011).
208 Kal Raustiala, supra note 14, at 51.
209 Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 321, 370 (2011).
210 Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, Exec. Order No. 13,609, 3 C.F.R. 255 (2012).

ZARING GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

FINANCIAL REFORM’S INTERNATIONALISM

5/27/2016 10:10 AM

1305

anything else, are remote.211 Narrowly targeted campaigns to take modest steps
towards those sorts of rights through the mechanisms of administrative law,
however, are less challenging.212
The regulatory cooperative components of the Dodd–Frank statute reflect
this. They are unabashedly technocratic, involving complicated aspects of
financial market plumbing and safety and soundness calculations.213 The
human rights commitments evinced by the statute are modest steps made
through technocratic allocations, rather than the sort of comprehensive human
rights-based treaties that might, say, protect the rights of women or guarantee
the fundamental privileges of childhood.214 Instead they seek to further rights
through something as bureaucratic as a disclosure regime imposed on
companies that file public reports for the delectation of investors.215
There are some reasons for enthusiasm in the change in the actors that
perform American engagement with foreign realms. The sole organ doctrine
has been criticized as a license for executive overreach.216 In an increasingly
pluralistic world, faced with a vast array of problems, presuming that a country
as diverse as the United States can channel its global engagement through one
focal point may be nothing more than a fond hope.
But there are costs to the new congressional and bureaucratic role. These
new actors are doing, in part, diplomacy, but they may be inexpert diplomats.
Coordination is difficult, and there is a somewhat random nature to the human
rights selected in Dodd–Frank for legislative enshrinement.
Nonetheless, we have seen how Congress has authorized American
agencies to cooperate with their foreign counterparts in different ways, and, in
so doing, has created a chance for those agencies to build an international
211

Catherine Jean Archibald, Forbidden by the WTO? Discrimination Against a Product When Its
Creation Causes Harm to the Environment or Animal Welfare, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 15, 34 (2008) (“In fact,
multilateral treaties are often extremely difficult to make.”). For a discussion of the reasons the Copenhagen
meetings designed to get a multilateral treaty on the books to address global warming, see Steven Ferrey,
Cubing the Kyoto Protocol: Post-Copenhagen Regulatory Reforms to Reset the Global Thermostat, 28 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 343 (2010).
212 See, e.g., Talking Foreign Policy: A Discussion on Cyber Warfare, 47 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 319,
339 (2015) (quoting an interview with Milena Sterio, who observed that “it would be extremely difficult and
probably impossible as of now to negotiate a big multilateral treaty. But . . . maybe . . . soft law instruments”
could serve as a substitute).
213 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2012).
214 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)–(q).
215 Id.
216 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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architecture of regulatory cooperation. Moreover, Congress has not tied
regulatory hands, at least not much, and not tried to solve this international
governance problem by passing a domestic law, or encouraging the President
to do the same on the international level.
Some caveats to the analysis are an appropriate way to conclude. This
Article will generally assume that regulatory cooperation is presumed by
Congress to be an effective mechanism for dealing with the problems of
cross-border finance. But of course, animating the decision to choose
regulatory cooperation over a treaty may be an assumption that regulatory
cooperation will constrain American regulators less than its international
governance alternatives.
To be sure, however, neither the government’s new international
commitments nor the rights and ethics based triggers for those commitments
should be viewed as requiring sea changes in the way American companies do
their business abroad. Congress has authorized cooperation abroad and in some
cases required agencies to talk, but it has not gone any further. It did not, for
example, delegate power—assuming no constitutional difficulty in doing so—
to a multinational member body like the Financial Stability Board to direct
American agencies to adhere to its requirements.
By the same token, nothing about the Resource Extraction Rule prohibits
companies from sending vast sums, with no strings attached, to foreign
governments to use in any way they see fit. Nor does the Conflict Mineral Rule
prevent American manufacturers from using as much gold, tin, tantalum, and
tungsten from war-torn central Africa as they wish. Disclosure alone is
required in both cases. The Conflict Minerals Rule reaches only one set of
conflicts and covers four minerals, though other conflicts and other minerals
do just as much damage to the human rights of the people who live in countries
that endure them.
Congress’s international moves are better understood as cautious—
symbolic and experimental, rather than evidence of a whole-hearted
commitment to internationalism and human rights. The experiment is
important and one that, if the agencies choose to act vigorously, could move
the locus of capital markets policy making from Washington to elsewhere. But
these are early steps on that journey, though it is this author’s view that the
journey is likely to continue.
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The result may be a world where the search for opinio juris is no longer
made, and rather agency-to-agency agreements set the standard for
international cooperation. As these agreements increasingly cover the map,
they can be evaluated on compliance, rather than on the reason for compliance.
Agencies may lead multinational innovations in the granting of rights. And the
oft-criticized compliance problems of customary international law will be
replaced by the more observable questions posed by whether agencies are
living up to their international agreements.
2. Requiring Ethical Business
As a domestic matter, the components of Dodd–Frank endorsing human
rights have an implication beyond the separation of powers. They expand a
role for the SEC: the ethical policeman of the international actions of publicly
listed American corporations.
This role is not entirely new; that agency has been acting against foreign
bribery since 1977.217 And, at any rate, the Supreme Court has said that a
“primary objective of the federal securities laws” entails the “promotion of ‘a
high standard of business ethics . . . in every facet of the securities
industry.’”218 Fraud itself—intentionally deceiving someone—is both the
principal means of policing the securities markets and an ethically rich concept
that turns on the duties owed to other people, not as market actors, but as those
who place their trust in others, and accordingly deserve the special care of
those others.
But even with these caveats in place, the SEC has traditionally focused on
nonjudgmental, rather than judgmental, disclosure. The traditional federal
approach has been to require publicly traded companies to make
comprehensive admissions about their businesses and balance sheets, and let
the public sort out whether it deems the business to be an upstanding one or
not.219 The traditional approach was one of process, not substance, and the
SEC was not thought to be in the business of forbidding sharp-elbowed or
morally dodgy firms from raising money from fully informed investors. It is
217

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (quoting SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–87 (1963)).
219 For example, see SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (noting that the goal of the securities
laws is “to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a
high standard of business ethics in the securities industry” (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972))).
218
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why scholars such as Hilary Sale could conclude that “the imposition of
explicit, substantive federal corporate law upon the traditional private ordering
model favored by state corporate regulators and judges” was a new
development and primary contributor to the federalization of corporate law. It
is also why state corporate law judges such as E. Norman Veasey believed that
because federal law stopped at disclosure, developing the content of the ethical
and fiduciary obligations imposed upon companies had been left to the
states.220
But ethics requirements may now be said to be an increasingly important
component of federal business regulation. Dodd–Frank builds on the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, passed in 2002, where Congress required publicly traded
companies to adopt or disclose their codes of ethics, or explain why they did
not have one.221 It is consistent with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, first
promulgated in 2004, which require companies to create “compliance and
ethics” programs, and to “otherwise promote an organizational culture that
encourages ‘ethical’ conduct and a commitment to compliance with the
law.”222
Congress, in short, has in the last fifteen years consistently tried to increase
the ethical standards imposed on publicly traded companies. The Conflict
Minerals and Resource Extraction Rules are consistent with this emphasis, and
they underscore the expectation that ethical obligations—in these cases rooted
in an understanding of international human rights—are not simply something
between shareholders and managers but something that applies more generally
to the types of activities in which a business can engage.

220 E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in a Post Enron/Worldcom Environment, 72 U.
CIN. L. REV. 731, 733 (2003). Veasey, the former chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, argues that
“[f]ederal securities laws are traditionally designed to focus on financial disclosure that directly affects
securities markets,” whereas “[s]tate corporation law traditionally focuses on the internal affairs of
corporations.” Id.
221 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 406(a)–(b), 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7264 (2012)); Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Securities Disclosure
Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010) (“Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (‘Sarbanes-Oxley’ or
‘SOX’) requires companies to disclose their codes of ethics (or explain why they do not have them) . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
222 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). For a
discussion, see John Carney & Jenna Felz, Executive Beware: The SEC Now Wants to Police Unethical
Corporate Conduct, FORBES (June 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2014/06/26/executivebeware-the-sec-now-wants-to-police-unethical-corporate-conduct/ (guest post with an introduction by Janet
Novack).
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Monitoring ethics in financial regulation is consistent with post-crisis
statements by financial regulators that they view ethical business practices as a
critical component of regulatory compliance. In 2014, William Dudley, the
current head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and a former investment
banker himself, emphasized the view that regulated banks must act ethically if
they hope to meet the requirements that their regulatory supervisors expect of
them.223 “There is evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many
large financial institutions,” Dudley declared.224 The New York Federal
Reserve General Counsel has also posited that “a strong ethical culture will
lead to better behavior.”225
Is it possible to make ethical foreign business practices a regulatory
requirement with any hope of clarity? After all, it is pretty unclear what
“ethics” require of the banks regulated by the SEC’s compatriot agency, the
Federal Reserve. Ethics as a regulatory tool for financial institutions look,
though they have never been carefully defined, as a principle, likely to make
banks more likely to meet their regulatory obligations. It is also an
acknowledgement that regulatory oversight cannot exist if the regulated
industry is “working to rule”226 or taking the perspective of the Holmesian bad
man about the law.227

223

William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. Officer of the Fed. Reserve Bank in N.Y., Address at
the Global Economic Policy Forum of New York: Ending Too Big to Fail (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.bis.org/
review/r131108g.pdf.
224 Id.
225 Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, As Regulators Focus on Culture, Wall Street Struggles to Define
It, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2015, 7:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-regulators-focus-on-culture-wallstreet-struggles-to-define-it-1422838659 (quoting Thomas Baxter, general counsel of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York). In the same vein, the Comptroller of the Currency has said that “[i]t is not going to work
if we approach it from a lawyerly standpoint . . . . It is more like a priest-penitent relationship.” Peter Eavis,
Regulators Size Up Wall Street, with Worry, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 12, 2014, 8:51 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/questions-are-asked-of-rot-in-banking-culture/.
226 “In a ‘work-to-rule’ campaign, workers refuse to perform any tasks voluntarily or exercise any
independent judgment and instead simply follow the letter of their employers’ work rules.” Craig Becker,
“Better Than a Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 355 n.23 (1994); see also WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 90–91 (1998) (observing that working to rule is effective because
“[i]n some areas, scrupulous compliance with the law is so burdensome and even disruptive that it occurs only
as a form of protest”).
227 See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want to
know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).
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Nonetheless, that agency has made the ethics of a bank not just a
recommendation, but a component of deciding whether it is fit to do business.
An ethical culture is one of the items on the checklist for evaluating whether a
bank would survive an emergency—banks that have failed to establish codes
of ethics may be deemed “undercapitalized,” and forced to raise money or,
ultimately, give up their charter to someone else.228
The Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction Rules are not vague
admonitions to “be ethical,” or to have in place a “code of ethics,” even if they
are not always amenable to straightforward and documentable compliance. By
no means has Congress suggested, or the SEC urged, a unspecified set of good
business practices on companies doing business abroad, designed, perhaps to
encourage reflection as much as anything else.229
But the sort of work being done from these rules are not like most
disclosure requirements. One appellate court likened the Conflict Minerals
Rules—compelling companies to declare that their products are “not DRC
conflict free”—to a badge of dishonor.230 It, in the court’s view, “requires an
issuer to tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted” and “to confess
blood on its hands.”231 This sort of obligation is very different than the
ordinary disclosure requirements imposed upon publicly traded companies,
who do not need to attest to, say, how they treat their workers at home, or the
nature of their interactions with the city and state governments in which they
do business.
Ed Rock has influentially argued that in corporate law the Delaware judges
make distinctions about corporate conduct based on a rather unstated set of
ethical requirements. In his view, “Delaware courts generate in the first

228

As the FDIC has explained in its handbook for managers subject to bank evaluations, banks must
establish a set of policies and goals, and “[t]hese objectives and policies should, at a minimum, cover . . .
internal routine and controls, audit programs, conflicts of interest, code of ethics, and personnel.” FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DSC RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES § 4.1 (2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/manual_examinations_full.pdf.
229 Seana Shiffrin regards this as a virtue. Not entirely specified standards “serve moral and democratic
deliberative purposes. Rather than applying a rule by rote, citizens must ask themselves, for example, whether
they are treating one another fairly, whether they are acting in good faith, whether they are taking due care,
whether they are behaving reasonably, and the like.” Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation:
On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (2010).
230 Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC,
748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014), overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C.
Cir. 2014)).
231 Id. (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 748 F.3d at 371).
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instance the legal standards of conduct (which influence the development of
the social norms of directors, officers, and lawyers) largely through what can
best be thought of as ‘corporate law sermons.’”232 When cases do not result in
judgments against inappropriate behavior, judges might substitute tonguelashings in court or in speeches.233 These standards are often hard to articulate
as a checklist, or a form of law amenable to encapsulation in a blackletter
treatise, though they are rooted in corporate fiduciary obligations.
Some of the international provisions of Dodd–Frank suggest that, at least
with regard to the way American businessmen conduct themselves abroad,
Congress has started to specify areas of sunlight that are meant to shine
particularly brightly on business practices of which it disapproves. In doing so,
financial reform’s internationalism is arguably acting like Delaware judges
who criticize unethical business conduct more than they ban it; that, too, is a
change in the focus of the regulation of business.
CONCLUSION
A complete picture of how international governance affects, and is affected
by, American lawmaking emerges when major domestic regulatory initiatives
are taken into account. Dodd–Frank is such a statute, and in it we see a bow to
globalization and an effort to address that phenomenon through soft law
techniques. Financial reform is premised on the idea that the American
financial system cannot be made safer without engaging in the global context
in which American finance operates.
It also serves as a new sort of vehicle for international rights, while
rebalancing the relationship between the branches of American government in
a way that removes power from the President, an accomplishment many
believed was beyond the ken or power of Congress.
For these reasons, we may expect to see similar delegations by Congress in
the wake of financial reform. The statute’s relationship to international law,
innovation in the structure of American foreign affairs responsibility, and even
its commitment to ethics, may prove to be precedential, rather than unique.

232 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV.
1009, 1016 (1997). Rock thought that court statements addressing managerially led buy outs, rife with
potential conflicts of interest and, ultimately, litigation, exemplified this sort of preaching. Id. at 1021–62.
233 Id.

